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Abstract
Facing a military defeat in the face of the 1918 German offensive on the Western
Front, the armies of the Entente reorganized under a Supreme Commander. This shift to
coordinated grand strategy in conjunction with Allied strategic disunity enabled the
Entente to destroy the armies of the Quadruple Alliance on the battlefield and bring the
Great War to a conclusion on November 11th, 1918.
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1
Introduction

1917 was a disastrous year for the armies of the Entente Cordial: Britain, France,
and Russia. The Allied or Central, Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the
Ottoman Empire had thwarted all offensives launched against them. The greatest blow
came in the East, where the Bolsheviks, now in nominal control of Russia, were in the
process of withdrawing from the war. Even the most optimistic Entente generals and
politicians conceded that the best hope to win the war would not come until either 1919
or 1920, when America could field a battle ready army. 1918 began with even worse
results. The Entente was faced with the very real possibility of defeat when the German
spring offensive steamrolled over Anglo-French positions, snatching territory held by its
enemies since 1914. On the verge of defeat, the Entente engaged in a series of grand
strategic machinations which stemmed the tide of defeat. At the same moment, the Allied
Powers, personified by Imperial Germany, engaged in a series of remarkably ill advised
diplomatic postures. These shifts by the Entente in grand strategy, as well as the serious
political overreach of peacemaking diplomacy by the Kaiser‘s government changed the
entire dynamic of the war. When the Entente threw their counterpunch their strategic
success enabled battlefield victories. By the end of 1918 the war was over. Coming faceto-face with military disaster in 1918, the Entente was able to secure victory by taking the
necessary strategic steps required in coalition warfare.
Neither the Entente‘s change in strategy nor the failures of the Allies in the realm
of diplomacy existed in a vacuum. For the first three years of war, the Entente had fought
to secure different strategic objectives. The French army, facing disaster, was prepared to
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separate itself from the British Expeditionary Force to protect Paris. Likewise, if the
British believed their position in Belgium to be threatened they were prepared to abandon
the French army to protect the Channel ports and their life-line to Britain. A fissure large
enough could allow the Germans to focus on pushing the British off the Continent in a
Dunkirk style evacuation. Without the British army, the French army would be
overwhelmed by superior German numbers and left to fruitlessly defend Paris.
This is where the reorganization of Entente strategy becomes essential. At the
height of the German onslaught, both the French and British armies reached a crisis
phase. They both allowed a fissure to grow between them as they retreated to protect
Paris and the Channel Ports respectively. With the creation of a unified commander, the
gap between the armies was sealed. When the Germans focused their attention on the
British army, the French army struck and vice versa. This frustrated and slowed down the
German army by the summer of 1918. This gave the Entente time to prepare a
counteroffensive, but for the first time striking in unison. As soon as the French army
tired, the British attacked, followed by the Americans. Constant pressure wore down and
destroyed the German army.
Also, the importance of German diplomacy in 1918 is that it had a direct impact
on German strategy. For Ludendorff to have all of the troops he needed for the 1918
spring offensive, German diplomats needed to conclude peace treaties with the
vanquished Russians and Romanians. This is because without a successful conclusion to
the peace talks, German troops were ordered to occupy the captured territories. In the first
two months of 1918, if the Russians and Romanians had agreed to the German terms, or
if the German territorial demands had not been as severe, then Germany would have been
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able to dispatch even more troops to the Western Front in time for spring. With sheer
numbers, the German army could have reached both the Channel Ports and Paris before
the Entente had time to enact its reorganization.
Finally, the failure to secure peace with Russia and Romania had a dire effect on
Germany‘s allies. Enver Pasha, the leader of the Ottoman Empire, had begun to
implement a plan to unite all ethnic Turks. To achieve this, he had ordered the majority of
the Turkish military into the city of Baku in the Russian held area that is modern day
Azerbaijan. These troops should have been directed to the Middle Eastern Front to hold
the line against British General Sir Edmund Allenby‘s Egyptian Expeditionary Force
(EEF). Sir Edmund‘s forces were severely reduced to reinforce the Entente in the face of
Ludendorff‘s Spring Offensive, thus a strengthened Ottoman army had the capability to
withstand the reduced EEF‘s advance. Also, the Austro-Hungarians had troops in Russia
as an occupying force. They would have been better served holding the line on the Italian
Front. When the Spring Offensive was launched, Ludendorff decided to remove German
forces from the Middle East and Italy, thus leaving these sectors with weakened defenses.
The Middle Eastern and Italian Fronts would not have decided the outcome of the Great
War, but holding these sectors would have enabled the Germans to operate on the
Western Front without the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires in
1918.
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Historiography

The key factor in the historiography of the Great War‘s final year is determining
why, after almost four years of stalemate, the Entente‘s army emerged victorious. The
first major authority of the war was Captain Basil Liddell Hart. Hart was sharply critical
of the Entente command in general and the British High Command in particular. In his
1930 book The Real War, Hart argues that the reason the Entente won was because it was
able to starve the Germans out of the war through blockade. 1 However, as Niall Ferguson
and Klaus Schwabe have argued, the food shortages in Germany due to the Entente
blockade were not as severe as the Weimar Government claimed. 2 In the years following
the Second World War a plethora of new research emerged. The most impactful of these
post-war studies was Alan Clark‘s The Donkeys, published in 1961. The titular donkey is
reference to an exchange involving General Erich von Ludendorff, General
Quartermaster of the German Army and General Max Hoffmann, Chief of Staff for the
German Eighth Army, in which the British army is likened to lions being led into battle
by donkeys. 3 Clark‘s book focused only on the British army‘s roles in the battles of 1915,

1

Basil Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (New York: Little, Brown and
Company, 1964), 470—6.
2

Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: Basic
Books, 2000), 276—81; Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Imperial Germany, and
Peacemaking, 1918—1919 Trans, Roger and Rita Kimber. (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1985), 148.
3

Alan Clarke, The Donkeys (New York: Award Books, 1965). vi.; Erich von
Falkenhayn, General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical Decisions, (Uckfield, East
Sussex: The Naval & Military Press, 2004). Clark is referencing an exchange between
Hoffmann and Ludendorff that was credited to the memoirs of Erich von Falkenhayn. No
such exchange actually takes place in Falkenhayn‘s memoir.
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but it quickly became a template to describe the entirety of the British High Command in
the Great War.4 Sir John French, Clark‘s main donkey, was quickly replaced after 1915
by Sir Douglas Haig, the man who replaced him as Commander in Chief of the British
Expeditionary Force. Alan Clark paralyzed British scholarship on the First World War.
All subsequent British histories of the Great War attempted to address, either directly or
indirectly, the competence of British command during the course of the Great War. Two
broadly definable camps within British scholarship have thus emerged: the advocates of
an incompetent British command who then must explain how the Entente was still able to
win the war despite poor leadership and supporters of the High Command 5, who, in their
zeal, diminish the role of every other army, European and colonial, fighting on the
Western Front.
Following Clark, and further establishing the incompetent High Command theory,
was Paul Fussell‘s 1975 book The Great War and Modern Memory. Although Fussell‘s
book is an examination of the literary trends present amongst the British soldiers serving
on the Continent, he established the war poets as the voice of the Great War. His main
poets were Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves, Edmund Blunden, and Wilfred Owen.
4

These include: Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000); Norman Stone World War One: A Short History. (New
York: Basic Books, 2009); and John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War: An Imperial History
(New York: Routledge, 2005).
5

The defenders of the High Command include: Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of
the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-1918 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996); Brian Bond, The Unquiet Western Front: Britain’s Role in
Literature and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Hew Strachan,
The First World War (New York: Penguin, 2005); Timothy Travers, The Killing Ground:
The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British
Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Staplehurst, Kent, UK: Spellmount
Ltd., 2006).
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Notably absent from Fussell‘s choice of key poets was Rupert Brooke, despite the fact
that he was the most popular of all of the war poets during the course of the war. 6 His
poetry was hawkish, idealizing the Great War and the righteousness of the Entente‘s
cause. His popularity diminished during the 1930s and was replaced by the more cynical
poets the same ones on whom Fussell placed his focus. Fussell dismisses Brooke because
his patriotic poetry was penned before he witnessed combat. Indeed, Brooke died of
blood poisoning en route to Gallipoli. The most memorable poem by Brooke, ―The
Soldier,‖ is widely remembered because it‘s opening sentence,
―If I should die, think only of this of me:
That there's some corner of a foreign field
That is forever England.‖ 7
greatly contrasts with Wilfred Owens concluding lines from ―Dulce Et Decorum Est‖:
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.‖ 8
The use of the disillusioned poets is rife with problems, as Janet S. K. Watson
shows in her 2004 book Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First
World War.9 Watson argues that the war writings of Blunden, Graves, and Sassoon, as
well as Erich Marie Remarque‘s All Quiet on the Western Front, reflected the time and
6

Bond, 29; Janet S. K. Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory,
and the First World War in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 185.
7

Rupert Brooke, 1914 and Other Poems (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1915),

5.
8

Wilfred Owen, The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen, ed. C. Day Lewis (New
York: New Directions, 1963), 55. The Latin means: ―It is sweet and fitting to die for
one‘s country.‖
9

Watson, 219—262.
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circumstances of their respective authors rather than an accurate portrayal of their
experiences during the Great War. Watson focuses on available diaries and less
remembered second editions available of the war memoirs. Robert Graves‘ Good-bye to
All That, for example, was released in 1929, following a suicide attempt by Graves‘
mistress. He revised it in 1957 and reduced most of his anti-war rhetoric making it more
of a reflection of his personal diary kept during the war, which drastically differs from the
original 1929 version.10 Notably, Graves‘ revision was released after World War II, when
Great Britain‘s wars with Germany were reassessed. After his death in 1985, the 1929
version was rereleased. Siegfried Sassoon‘s war diaries differ drastically from his George
Sherston trilogy of Memoirs of a Fox Hunting Man (1928), Memoirs of an Infantry
Officer (1930), and Sherston’s Progress (1936), but they coincide with his less
memorable memoirs The Old Century and Seven More Years (1938), The Weald of Youth
(1942), and Siegfried’s Journey (1946).11 Watson also argues that Blunden‘s memoir was
highly praised upon its release in 1928 by those who had not become disillusioned by the
war. Blunden (successfully) and Graves (unsuccessfully), both tried to enlist in the
British army during World War II. The war poets‘ memoirs are thus not an accurate
representation of their views of the Great War, but rather they reflected the

10

Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That (New York: Doubleday, 1957; New York:
Anchor, 1998).
11
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disillusionment of post-war Britain, which was facing one of the most severe economic
downturns in history.
Niall Ferguson‘s 1998 The Pity of War employs a counterfactual methodology to
place all of the blames imaginable at the feet of the British High Command. Ferguson
argues that if Britain remained on the sidelines, then Germany would have won the war.
The victorious Germans then would have formed a prototype version of the European
Union. Economically, this German dominated proto-European Union was a danger to
Britain‘s economic influence in Europe. Ferguson argues this was a short-sighted
miscalculation on the part of Herbert Asquith‘s government. A victorious Germany
would have nudged Britain out as the economic power house on the Continent, but the
war would have left Britain‘s colonial acquisitions intact. In Ferguson‘s view, the only
danger a German peace would have created was a France dominated by radical
nationalists. With the World economy not reeling from the effects of war in the 1920s
and 30s and a Kaiserreich Germany acting as a counterbalance on the Continent to a still
Tsarist Russia, ―Adolf Hitler could have eked out his life as a mediocre postcard painter
and a fulfilled old soldier … [a]nd Lenin could have carried on his splenetic scribbling in
Zurich, forever waiting for capitalism to collapse – and forever disappointed.‖12 Since
Britain intervened the war was unnecessarily dragged on until 1918, when the United
States presence in the conflict began to be felt. The intervention of the United States,
according to Ferguson, was a disaster for the British. In their inability to conclude the
war, Britain lost their financial and military prestige, which began the slow decline of the
British Empire. Ferguson focuses on the statistic of German soldiers surrendering in mass

12

Ferguson, 460.
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numbers, unseen in any year but 1918, as a sign that the German soldier had become so
disillusioned by the sheer number of Americans that they abandoned hope.
A curious counterfactual left untouched by Ferguson is: ―What would have
happened in the Great War if America remained on the sidelines?‖ One statistic Ferguson
overlooks is the number of soldiers that were deployed in 1918. The German army
actually held a numerical superiority over the combined armies of the Entente. Also,
Germany had divisions still waiting to be transferred from the Eastern Front, which
collapsed in 1917. This numerical superiority, even when considering the number of
Americans arriving in France each month, would have favored the Germans until the
summer of 1919. Thus, in Ferguson‘s argument, a numerically superior army, which had
just made the greatest gains in the course of the war, was flushed with a rash of desertions
to an opposing army that was numerically inferior. If the Germans were cognizant of the
fact that they were indeed losing the war, this may explain their desertion rates. But
Captain Ernst Jünger wrote in 1920 he was unaware Germany was losing the war until
September, 1918.13 For other German soldiers, most famously Corporal Adolf Hitler,
they never acknowledged the fact that Germany was losing the war by the end of 1918. 14
Ferguson‘s major contribution to the literature is his painstaking use of the battlefield
statistics for 1918. Ferguson argued that the German army was decisively defeated on the
battlefield, which was far more significant than unrest on the German home front causing
the war to end, although he credits the thought of an ever increasing American military as

13

Ernst Jünger, Storm of Steel, trans. Michael Hofman (New York: Penguin
Books, 2003), 255.
14

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1971), 231; 275.
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the cause of disillusionment, rather than serious military setback. Thus for Ferguson the
―donkeys‖ extend beyond British High Command to White Hall. The British Command
is still donkeys because their attacks proved ineffectual until 1918 when German soldiers
were ready to surrender en masse.
Those who wrote grand narratives of the Great War, such as Sir Martin Gilbert‘s
1994 The First World War, John Keegan‘s 1998 The First World War, Hew Strachan‘s
2003 The First World War and Norman Stone‘s 2007 World War One agree, in varying
degrees, on a set of circumstances, explored below, which secured victory to the Entente.
Furthermore, although they vary on the competency of the British High Command and
the overall High Command personified by Field Marshal Foch, each author credits
extenuating circumstances, not conduct on the field or shifting strategy, to be the key to
victory in 1918.
The first of the arguments that is included in all of the grand narratives was the
technological and logistical edge the Entente possessed during the final year of the war.
On the logistical side, the argument is that with the vast amount of production available
to the Entente, the Germans could not produce enough equipment to keep pace with their
foes. Furthermore, the German government was hesitant to allow women into the
factories to replace men bound for the Front, thus at the critical juncture in the war
Germany no longer had the men to supply the frontlines and the factories producing the
tools of war. The problem with this argument, however, stems from the other side of
logistics, namely the supply of goods in addition to their procurement. It is true that the
Entente‘s production capability far outstripped Imperial Germany‘s, but a key problem
began with transporting goods manufactured in America to the other members of the
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Entente. As woefully prepared for the war as America was in 1917, the state of her
merchant marine was even worse. With literally hundreds of thousands of American
soldiers to transfer across the Atlantic, the American merchant marine could not keep
pace. The American government attempted to ship both material and men across the
ocean.15 In trying to do both it did neither well. It was not until the height of the
Ludendorff offensives in 1918 that an agreement was reached which facilitated the flow
of American men and material. The German army was already in retreat by the time
shipments from America became stabilized. 16
The grand narratives also agree that in most areas of armaments the Entente
possessed a technological edge over the Allies. This was most felt in the area of tank
warfare. By war‘s end, the Entente had produced thousands of tanks in contrast to the
slightly more than fifty produced by Imperial Germany. Germany used more captured
British tanks than it ever produced for itself. Although the British and French tanks were
excellent weapons, they were useless in the defense. In the case of a retreat they
possessed a serious danger to the retreating army by clogging up already heavily
congested road and rail heads. Thus, the role of tanks during the Ludendorff offensives

15

Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986),
537; Robert H. Zieger, Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Lanham:
Bowman and Littlefield, 2001), 57—58. Although America produced the majority of
Entente war material, Britain and France still remained strong producers. In transporting
soldiers across the Atlantic, the United States could not equip its soldiers with American
goods. Thus, the doughboy in France fought with an American rifle, a British uniform, a
combination of British and French tanks, and French airplanes.
16

Ziegler, 114.
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proved to be a moot point. Tanks played an insignificant role in checking the German
advances in the spring of 1918.17
The other weapon of war of which the Entente possessed a numerical superiority
was airplanes. Since their introduction in 1915, combat aircraft had become more
essential to military planners. The first to seriously study the use of air power in warfare
was Italian pilot and theorist Giulo Douhet.18 Douhet argued that air warfare grew during
the Great War, but was not at a stage to provide a decisive blow. Advances in aircraft
design could possibly be more decisive role, but they had not reached that point by the
time he revised his seminal work, The Command of the Air, in 1927. Also, as Tami Davis
Biddle argues in Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and
American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 the role of tactical bombing
specifically and air combat in general was too much in the experimental phase to change
the tide of battle. 19 The bombers in the Great War carried a remarkably small payload and
their bombs could only be dropped within a narrow radius from their home airfields. Air
warfare existed as more of a potential in the minds of military planners rather than an
effective weapon on the battlefield.

17

Martin Gilbert, The First World War (New York: Owl Books, 1994), 407;
Strachan, 316.
18
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The other circumstance which the grand narratives claim led to the defeat of
Germany is the collapse of the German home front.20 While the situation in Berlin
deteriorated rapidly during 1918, political extremists from the political right and left took
to the streets. However, as Berlin reached a state of chaos by November 1918, the only
branch of the Imperial Germany military to crack was the Navy. The sailors of the
German navy revolted in November, after the war was already decided, when they were
ordered on a suicide run into the North Sea. Their rebellion did not spread to the army.
Furthermore, as Dietrich Orlow argued the anti-war political groups were never well
organized or very effective.21 The German army was not betrayed from the home front, as
fellow National Socialists Erich von Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler claimed, but were
defeated on the battlefield and had ceased to be an effective fighting force.22 As Roger
Chickering argued, German morale on the home front and within the army persisted until
the serious major defeats suffered by the German army occurred in September, which
was when Jünger also believed that the war was over.23
The view that attempts to bridge the gap between the lions led by donkey
approach and the apologists for Sir Douglas Haig is personified by Tim Travers and
Andy Simpson. Tim Travers‘ The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front
& the Emergence of Modern War 1900-1918, examines the evolution of the British army
20
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from the Victorian era. The British Expeditionary Force landed in Belgium in 1914
prepared to fight a grand battle that was akin to the Napoleonic wars of the 19 th Century.
Promotion within the British army relied more heavily upon birth rather than merit.
However, after disastrous showings in the early years of the war, the British army
reconstituted itself as a modern fighting force, with merit becoming essential to
promotion, new tactics such as small attack forces suited to anti-trench warfare, and a
reorganization of the British command structure as key. Travers does bridge the gap by
arguing that when appointed head of the BEF Douglas Haig was disastrously prepared to
fight a 19th century style war. However, once in command Haig adapted to the nuances of
the Great War and by 1918 had abandoned his teachings in favor of 20 th century warfare
involving combined air, ground, and armor attacks. Andy Simpson‘s Directing
Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18 singles out the
reorganization of the command structure, specifically at the Corps level, as being the key
to British victory in 1918. The problem is that many of these reforms had already been
carried out by both Britain‘s ally and enemy. France had used small bands of anti-trench
units as early as 1916. German storm troopers were the essential tactic of the initial
success of the Ludendorff offensives. Furthermore, both armies had undergone similar
reorganizations of the corps level in 1917. The problem with Simpson‘s argument is that
although the expansion of the Corps did have a great impact on the British army, the
British were the last to enact these reforms, thus it is not unique to the British. In fact due
to timing, the British adaptation of the Corps was a hindrance, not a help as Simpson
argues, because Britain‘s enemies had already undergone these procedures and it would
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take time to implement these changes, which was the exact timeframe that the Germans
attacked.
On the other extreme view of the British command is Paddy Griffith‘s Battle
Tactics of the Western Front: the British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18. Griffith argues
that the British were solely responsible for the success of the Entente in the Great War.
He argues that after the disastrous showing during the Somme offensive, the British army
transformed itself into a modern army equipped with modern weapons, such as the
airplane and tank, and using tactics such as small band anti-trench warfare. Winston
Churchill shared this point of view, writing in 1931 that ―It was galling to the British
Headquarters … to find the credit ascribed by their own Cabinet and public opinion to
Marshal Foch.‖24 Griffith further contends that Sir Douglas Haig, alone amongst Entente
commanders, was able to enact the reforms necessary for victory. Once the reforms were
completed, the German army was steamrolled by the British, which forced the Germans
to capitulate. However, Griffith fails to mention that most of Sir Douglas Haig‘s reforms
were the last to be performed by an army on the Western Front. Both French and German
soldiers had adapted to the small anti-trench tactics. Tanks and airplanes were useless to
the Entente for the majority of 1918 and much of the offensive action in 1918 stretched
well beyond the British sector.
Griffith does argue that one problem with the historiography of the Great War is
the highly nationalistic literature which attempts to describe the reason for victory. For
example, the Canadian authors focus on their nations fight at Vimy Ridge proving to be
the key battle that broke Germans resistance or Americans using the Meuse-Argonne as

24
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the key battle of the war. Although the focus for Griffith was on the former members of
the British Empire taking credit for victory, he also directed his ire at the Americans for
claiming that their army proved decisive in the outcome of the war. In this, Griffith is in
fact correct. Robert H. Zieger argues in America’s Great War: World War I and the
American Experience that American capital and manpower entered the fray at a key
juncture, enabling the Entente to achieve victory. Taking that argument a step further,
Alan Axelrod in Miracle at Belleau Wood: The Birth of the Modern U.S. Marine Corps
and Edward G. Lengel in To Conquer Hell: The Meuse Argonne, 1918 argue that the
actions of the United States Marine Corps and army respectively proved the decisive
factor in ultimate victory.
The problem with highly nationalistic historiography, to use Griffith‘s term, is
that it discounts the roles of the rest of the Entente in achieving final victory. In 1918, no
one army could have stood against the German army. The American army was fresh, but
it was largely untrained and unsupplied. The British and the French armies were
experiencing a crisis in manpower levels. New soldiers could not fill the ranks of the
dead fast enough. While Germany also faced a crisis in manpower, it held a vast reserve
of seasoned soldiers on the Eastern Front.
The only way Germany could be defeated in 1918 was if the Entente fought as a
united entity, which in the middle of 1918 is exactly what they finally did. After halting
the initial German advance in 1914, the Entente fought as a loose coalition. An attack by
one major power was launched with the other power attacking for the purpose of
relieving pressure or to distract the Germany army from the real attack. In 1917 this
system collapsed. The British attack on the city of Arras during the Battle of Chemin des
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Dames threatened the main French assault. The pressure on the French was too severe
and the army collapsed. This loose coalition broke at the worst moment. Its little
successes had resulted because Germany fought a defensive war on the Western Front
after Verdun. After winning the war on the Eastern Front, Germany returned to offensive
action. For the Entente to survive in 1918, it had to abandon the loose coalition system
that had been in place since 1914. The creation of a Supreme Commander was created
out of necessity because it had become obvious to the British and French army
commanders that their system was a failure. A Supreme Commander could coordinate the
war strategy in a manner that produced results because he could use the Entente armies to
the best of their abilities by fighting as a united Front. The Entente‘s system of attacking
as subterfuge or as a means to relieve pressure was abandoned in favor of a unified army
that attacked the overwhelming German army with the purpose of bleeding it white. Once
the German advance was stopped, then the united Entente armies could bring their
technological superiority to bare and defeat the German army.
German diplomacy in 1918 is important because of the dire consequences it had
on German strategy. The inability to quickly end the peace talks for the Eastern Front
prevented not only the Germans from adding more troops to their role, but also prevented
the Austro-Hungarians and the Ottomans from relieving troops in the east and shoring up
the Italian and Middle Eastern Fronts respectively. Once the Austro-Hungarians and the
Ottomans folded, Germany could not remain in the war alone. Unlike the Entente which
realized they were stronger fighting as one, the Triple Alliance never reconciled their
strategies. The Entente learned the failures of loose coalition warfare in 1918. The Triple
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Alliance fought the Great War in 1918 the way that the Entente had tried to fight in the
previous three years of the war and it proved to be their undoing.
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The Disasters of 1917

On the Western Front at the start of 1917, General Robert Nivelle was promoted
Commander in Chief of the French army. His tenacious fighting spirit at the Battle of
Verdun in 1916 was deemed a key ingredient to restore the élan of the French army,
which was still reeling from the massive number of casualties it had suffered at Verdun.
As a Protestant, he was also a politically attractive candidate in the era of the Third
French Republic where the French army and Catholicism were viewed as harboring antirepublican sentiment and posing as grave dangers to the Republic. 25 It was these politics
which prevented Henri-Philippe Pétain and Ferdinand Foch from being named
Commander in Chief.
Although dubbed the ―Hero of Verdun,‖ Nivelle‘s spotlight of glory was really a
diversion from Henri-Philippe Pétain. Pétain was an advocate of defensive warfare which
was anathema to the French General Staff. Since the disaster at Sedan during the FrancoPrussian War, the French General Staff held a near mythical regard for staying on the
attack.26 The obsession with attacking also placed greater emphasis on the role of élan
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and the bayonet charge rather than rifle proficiency and group tactics. In the General
Staff‘s view, Pétain‘s successful defense of Verdun was due to Nivelle‘s offensive strikes
against the German army, when the reality was the reverse. Petain‘s stringent defense of
Verdun wore down the opposing German army to the point where they could not resist
Nivelle‘s attack.27
Another man well acquainted with the impact of politics impeding military
advancement was General Ferdinand Foch. While Nivelle was a practicing Protestant,
Foch was an ardent and strict Catholic. Always wary of domestic threats, the secular
Third Republic held such strident Catholicism as an incubator of insurrection. Foch had
kept his politics closely to his vest and avoided wading into political minefields in his
early career, such as the Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs 28. However, although a well
regarded instructor at France‘s premier military school, École Supérieur de Guerre,
Foch‘s career moved along at a snail‘s pace. In 1907 a frustrated Foch met with then
Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, who revealed to Foch that the French military had
maintained a file on him and tagged him as a potential threat to the Republic and accused
27
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him of grade manipulation while teaching at the École Supérieur de Guerre. 29 It is
unknown what Foch said to Clemenceau, but after the meeting promotions began to come
his way, although he was still viewed in general with suspicion by his fellow officers. As
a fighting general, Foch had the unbelievable deficiency of being deemed too aggressive
in an army that obsessed over attack and élan. During the Battle of the Marne in 1914,
while in command of the Ninth Army, Foch outran his support and his forces were almost
surrounded and destroyed by German troops. In the heat of battle Foch sent the immortal
dispatch, ―My center is giving way, my right is in retreat. Situation excellent. I attack.‖ 30
After the battle, Foch was removed from field command because, even by the French
warrior code of élan, the casualties sustained by the forces under his command during the
First Battle of the Marne were deemed too severe. He was tasked by then Commander in
Chief Joseph Joffre to serve as an intermediary between Joffre and his British counterpart
Sir John French. A little more than a month into the war and French and Joffre were
barely on speaking terms. In September 1914, with Foch operating as a strategic liaison,
the British and French armies demonstrated at least a semblance of working together.31
Foch‘s diplomatic skills and belief in inter-strategic warfare proved invaluable. He was
one of the first to realize the potential for a strong coalition striking in unison. For the
first month of the Great War, the British Expeditionary Force and the French army
operated independently with a total lack of Entente cooperation, but Foch‘s actions were
cementing his strategic beliefs that led to the salvation of his country four years later.
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Once the position of Supreme Commander was created in 1918, Foch was the logical
choice to fill it because he understood the potential of a strong coalition.
Foch‘s previous role as an instructor at the École Supérieur de Guerre served him
well as a liaison. He spent his career analyzing the failures of the French offensives of the
Franco-Prussian war. Although a proponent of the attack, he disagreed with the
widespread belief in the offensive at all costs. He believed an attack was dependent on a
successful coordination of all available resources, unlike the infantry centered belief in
élan. This contrasted sharply with Robert Nivelle. Thrust into the spotlight in March of
1917, Nivelle wasted little time making the cocktail and reception circuits. At these
gatherings, he was more than willing to boast about his designs for an upcoming French
offensive. These stories quickly made their way to the German lines. German troops
began preparing defense in depth for an impending French attack. Nivelle‘s plan called
for a British diversionary attack on the city of Arras. This attack, in Nivelle‘s mind,
should pull enough German troops northward to stop the British attack allowing the
French army to tear through the then depleted German defenders in the French sector,
advancing some six miles on the first day. According to Nivelle‘s plan, if the attack was
overwhelming enough, then French troops should have an open path to Berlin. 32
British General Douglas Haig had barely survived with his command intact at the
end of 1916. Although he was popular with the British press and Cabinet, he was
intensely disliked by the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. Haig had proposed a
British summer offensive in the British held Belgium sector of Ypres. He recognized that
the British army needed time to recover from the Somme offensive of 1916 and the army
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was not ready for a full assault. Furthermore, Haig had a growing fascination with a
British invented super weapon that possessed the real possibility of winning the war on
the Western Front: the tank. However, the tank was still in the early stages of production
and would not be available in large quantities to be deployed on the Western Front until
late summer 1917, at the earliest. Lloyd George promptly vetoed Haig‘s plan. He even
went two steps further in undermining Haig‘s command. First, he urged Haig to
subordinate his army to Nivelle‘s command. Second, he placed political capital on the
success of Nivelle‘s offensive by publicly expressing confidence that the French were on
the verge of winning the war with minimal support from the British forces on the
Western Front. Consequently, Lloyd George believed the best role for Britain in ultimate
victory was to support offensives away from France and Belgium. He therefore urged
Haig to relinquish units to be sent to the Middle East and Italy. 33 Haig, and by extension
the British army, was trapped in a no-win situation of political machinations and interEntente rivalries. Lloyd George‘s dislike for Haig came from the Prime Minister‘s utter
lack of faith in him as a military commander because of the amount of casualties incurred
in all of Haig‘s battles. For Douglas Haig, the dislike of David Lloyd George was
personal. Haig was personally loyal to the former British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith
and believed Lloyd George to be an unnecessary micromanager. 34 These factors only
metastasized once the Nivelle offensive began.
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With German defenders waiting for an impending attack in the French sector, the
British diversionary attack was the perfect surprise attack. The diversion quickly became
a rout. On April 12th, 1917, the British overran Arras and captured the strategic vantage
point of Vimy ridge. On his own initiative, Haig fell victim to ―mission creep‖ and
convinced himself that the limited diversionary attack had evolved into a breakthrough
attack which had punched a hole in the German lines. Without consulting Nivelle, Haig
began to divert the British army to plow through the gap created at Arras. He ordered the
cavalry, still the offensive weapon of choice for mobile warfare, to move to the front
lines and await their chance to exploit the evolving military success. Haig‘s initiative
infuriated Nivelle. By moving the cavalry up from the rear, the British army was clogging
roads deemed by Nivelle to be vital to French logistics. 35 Nivelle was so angry he refused
to speak to Haig and halted all inter-Entente coordination.36 Nivelle‘s plan had always
been questionable. Overwhelming force as the basis for a breakthrough had failed every
time it had been tried. When Nivelle‘s temper turned the French attack into an insular
proposition, he signed the death warrant for his career.
An ardent follower of the cult of his own greatness, Nivelle had spent the weeks
preceding his offensive boasting about the predicted gains the French army could make
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on a day by day basis. Once he perceived his plan to have been undermined by Haig,
Nivelle launched the French attack with an eye firmly placed on restoring his own glory.
Immediately, the plan was an utter disaster for France. The Germans had been waiting
since the start of 1917 for a French offensive and were well prepared for the attack.
Nivelle‘s audacious claims of six mile gains each day crashed against the reality of
miniscule gains coupled with a grave number of French casualties. His subordinate
generals began to suggest to Nivelle that his plan had failed. Nivelle dismissed their
advice and ordered a greater number of French troops to join the fray. It is spectacular
how poorly Nivelle interpreted the situation. Even his most conservative estimates for
daily gains were substantially higher than the reality on the ground. Worse, the number of
casualties the French army was already racking up was depleting its manpower at an
alarming rate. The offensive should have been called off, but Nivelle was overwhelmed
and his deficiencies as a commander had been laid bare. 37 He resolved to keep fighting at
the Battle of Chemin des Dames with another overwhelming assault and in doing so he
created the best possibility to win the war on the Western Front in 1917 – for the
Germans. 38 The French army was locked in a stalemate and over the course of the
Nivelle offensive sustained more than half a million casualties, compared to German
casualties of slightly over a hundred and sixty thousand.
The morale amongst the rank and file French troops, the poilu, had been shattered.
They had pinned their hopes on Nivelle‘s boisterous claims and they perceived the
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massive failure of the offensive from the onset. Nivelle‘s continued pursuit of the
offensive convinced many French troops their lives were worthless to their commander.
Something had to give and in the presence of continued demands to renew the offensive
it did; the French army mutinied in May. French soldiers sat in their trenches and refused
all commands to attack. After years of suffering poor conditions with only the rarest
opportunity to enjoy leave, the French army was now placed under the command of a
man they increasingly viewed as disconnected from the reality they faced. Men simply
laid down their rifles and refused to keep fighting until their demands of more leave time,
less offensive fighting, and better pay were met. The French mutiny was the greatest
secret of the war. The Germans never learned the size and extent of the revolt. Haig was
aware of the mutiny, but the French failed to inform him of the extent of the collapse of
the French army with half of the French army participating in the mutiny. The Germans
were content to reinforce their defensive positions. 39 If they had attacked the French
sector at this point, they would have faced a disorganized and leaderless collection of
soldiers, not a functioning army.
This crisis forced a change in the French government and General Staff‘s thought
processes. Élan had finally been discredited. Nivelle was quickly sacked and replaced by
General Philippe Pétain. Pétain ordered an end to the Nivelle offensive and promised his
troops that they would not take any offensive action for the rest of 1917. He reorganized
the army‘s handling of leave, greatly increasing the availability and duration of trips
away from the front. He also reduced the suggested execution numbers of the mutineers
against the wishes of many French generals who demanded a large scale purge of the
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French army of elements they deemed subversive. 40 Pétain kept the French army on the
field, but as a fighting force they were spent. He was content to let the British continue
attacking the Germans while the French remained on the defensive and waited for their
new ally, the United States, to enter the war.
Nivelle‘s failure was due in no small part to the lack of strategic unity between
the British and French armies. Once the battle began, Haig and Nivelle pursued their own
objectives. This was standard operating procedure as an Entente attack was the
responsibility of one nation with an Entente power attacking at the same time at an area
that was advantageous for them. Although the attacks coincided, they were not
coordinated, meaning that one attack had the real possibility to provide little or no aid to
the main offensive. This led to continual stalemate across the Western Front for the
Entente.
Although the Germans remained in the dark over the extent of the French mutiny,
Douglas Haig was well aware that he had to act quickly to divert the Germans‘
attention.41 He had been granted a political reprieve after Lloyd George‘s open support
for Nivelle had proved calamitous. Haig raced to implement his original design to attack
German positions in the Ypres sector. By advancing his timeline as far forward as he
could, Haig denied himself the use of adequate air and tank support, which earlier had
been so precious to him. 42However, the greatest unforeseen circumstance which doomed
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Haig‘s operation was a brief collaboration between the Imperial German army and the
weather.
Almost as soon as the Third Battle of Ypres began, unseasonable rains turned the
battlefield into a quagmire. Artillery became worthless as the guns became stuck in the
mud, shells sank in the mud without exploding, and ammunition resupply became
dependent on pack animals. As concern began to mount within the British ranks over the
success of the operation, Haig began to drastically scale back the attack‘s objectives. He
focused on the strategically worthless village of Passchendaele, which gave the Third
Battle of Ypres its popular name. 43 As the campaign wore down, Haig unleashed his tank
corps at Cambrai. The early attacks by the tanks yielded significant gains, but Haig was
not fast enough to consolidate the tank corps‘ gains. German counterattacks destroyed or
disabled a significant portion of Britain‘s tanks. Passchendaele was successful in the fact
that it relieved enormous pressure from the French. Although the tank had proven only
moderately successful at Cambrai, its actions convinced Haig that the tank was a weapon
that could significantly alter the way the war was fought on the ground. Yet,
Passchendaele had cost the British army far too many casualties. At nearly a half of a
million, casualty numbers mirrored the failed Somme offensive. The possibility of a
manpower shortage in the British army was now a reality.
Further compounding Haig‘s position was that the failure at Passchendaele had
enabled Lloyd George to regain enough political capital to reassert his doubts about
Haig‘s ability. Lloyd George was able to convince the war cabinet to divert troops from
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Haig‘s command to other Fronts. The unintended consequence of the depletion of troops
was that it forced the army to restructure its units, which other armies had done as early
as 1915.44 The most important of these reorganizations was the formation of a corps
command that separated the General Staff from the divisional level. The corps began to
assume the minutia of command, such as establishing communications and coordinating
grand strategy into specific maneuvers for the divisions. This reorganization also
streamlined British divisions, enabling them to become more flexible as they did not have
to deal with the duties that the corps was assuming. Britain‘s reorganization briefly
proved to be a disaster in 1918 when the gutted British Fifth Army, used to resupply the
First through Fourth armies, was holding the exact position the Germans attacked in
1918, but the process proved invaluable by the end of 1918. For now Haig, like Pétain,
had to wait on the Americans.
The British and French offensives of 1917 brought the war no closer to a
conclusion. At the heart of their failure was the lack of strategic coordination. The
Nivelle Offensive began to collapse when British interests diverged from the French
battle plan. Without coordinating with Nivelle, Haig transformed his limited diversionary
attack into an attempt to break the German lines. His mission creep is one of the gravest
sins of coalition warfare: he failed to inform his ally of his intention. Instead of
coordinating with Haig on the new realities on the ground, Nivelle attempted to attack the
Germans according to the original plan, which was impossible because the British had
radically transformed the dynamic of the battle. The lack of a Supreme Command was
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most critical at this juncture because the Entente armies had no one to step in and mediate
the crisis. Instead, Haig and Nivelle‘s egos conspired to doom the offensive.
The British attack at Third Ypres was nothing more than a reaction to the failure
of the Nivelle Offensive. In planning for Third Ypres, Haig, never knowing the extent of
the French mutiny, assumed he would have the support of the French army for the attack.
For their part, the French were vague in their promises to Haig. Again, this was a grave
crisis which a Supreme Commander could have remedied. Haig ordered the British army
to attack the Germans at Ypres in what he assumed was a coalition attack, but Haig‘s
most important ally, the French, were misleading him on the shape of their army. With
this fact in mind, it was impossible for the Third Battle of Ypres to be anything but a
disaster. The lack of grand strategic planning between the Entente generals was creating a
killing ground for their men.

31
America Goes To War

Germany‘s worst political mistake for the totality of the war up to 1917 had been
the way it had handled the relationship with the United States, the largest non-combatant
in the world. Americans were hesitant to enter a European affair and large numbers of
Irish and German immigrants even favored supporting the Allied Powers. The American
government of President Woodrow Wilson was content to keep America on the sidelines
and pursue a ―business as usual‖ approach to Europe. Wilson believed that the war was
simply a European affair and that the United States had little to gain from intervention.
This reflected American public opinion. However, Germany began to draw America‘s ire
when it leaned on its submarine fleet of unterseeboots, or U-boats, to break the ever
tightening British blockade. When German u-boats sank a collection of passenger liners,
most particularly the Cunard liner Lusitania off the Irish coast in May 1915, taking the
lives of one hundred twenty-eight Americans, America successfully applied enough
diplomatic pressure to force the Imperial German government to quit its U-boat
campaign. 45 Yet, a few days after the sinking of RMS Lusitania, Woodrow Wilson
reaffirmed America‘s commitment to neutrality. Speaking in Philadelphia on the 10 th of
May, President Wilson said: ―There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight;
there is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by
force that it is right.‖46 Germany continued to antagonize, however, spending 1916
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sanctioning terrorist raids and sabotage in America.47 The most successful strike was
against a munitions factory in New York City. The raids increased American distrust and
hostility toward Germany, even as the American public was turning out in large numbers
to re-elect President Wilson, whose most effective campaign slogan had been ―He kept us
out of war.‖ Germany also monitored a festering situation on the American-Mexican
border. After the Mexican bandit Poncho Villa led a successful attack in New Mexico, an
American expeditionary force led by General John J. Pershing pursued him across the
Mexican border. This quickly became a disaster. Pershing‘s invasion galvanized Mexican
opinion against America and Villa became a hero. The government in Mexico City
denounced Pershing‘s invasion as a threat to their sovereignty and supported Villa‘s
attack on the American troops.48 This situation was rapidly devolving into an
embarrassment to the American government and the Germans perceived an opportunity.
In early 1917, German foreign minister Arthur Zimmermann developed a plan to
keep America out of the war in Europe. He composed a message to the Mexican
government asking them to join the Allied Powers and declare war on the United States.
In return, the Germans offered to support the Mexican annexation of Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, and California. The problem for Zimmermann and his eponymous telegram was
that before it was ever received by a Mexican official it was intercepted and decoded by
both the British and American governments. Wilson had the telegram turned over to the
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American press, where it was obviously front page news. Zimmermann, in a remarkably
bad political move, took credit for writing the telegram without a hint of regret. In
response, the American government cut diplomatic ties with Imperial Germany. 49 The
battle for the seas and the Zimmermann telegram were pushing America toward war, but
it was unable to bring any relief to the German economy.
As 1917 progressed, the British blockade was beginning to hurt the German
economy. The German fleet had been trapped in Wilhelmshaven since the inconclusive
Battle of Jutland in 1915. The battle was inconclusive in the sense that it brought a
Western Front style stalemate to the naval war. Although the Germans were confined to
Wilhelmshaven for the duration of the war, Jutland was long perceived by the British to
be a loss. As the Chicago Daily Tribune reported on the Seventh of June, 1915 that the
death of then British War Minister Horatio Herbert Kitchener was ―the second shock the
country has sustained within a week. The other was when the newspapers appeared
…with the first intelligence of the naval battle in the North sea in the form of a list of the
ships lost, with virtually no intimation that there was any compensation in the way of
enemy losses.‖50 The British did incur more losses at the Battle of Jutland. Even though
the German fleet was trapped in Wilhelmshaven, the British never again tried to destroy
the German fleet. Winston Churchill attributed this to a predisposition of over
cautiousness on the part of the Admiralty. 51 The British navy could not leave the North
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Atlantic because Jutland had failed to destroy the German navy, thus the Royal Navy was
unable to sail to another theater to assist in operations around the World.
The German General Staff decided to gamble on the end of the war. It was
apparent to them that Germany was on the verge of total victory in the East. They also
realized that possible American intervention in the war could take up to two years to be
fully implemented. If Germany could act fast enough, then their U-boat fleet could
cripple Britain in a counter-blockade, relieving the pressure of the British blockade, and
defeat Russia and overwhelm the Western Front with recently relieved troops from the
East before American troops ever set foot in Europe. On April 1st, 1917, Germany
therefore announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. The United States
Congress issued a declaration of War against Germany. 52 While this action heartened the
Allies, Germany‘s estimation of America‘s military capacity was fairly accurate. America
had one of the smallest armies of any major nation and to train and supply an ever
expanding American army was going to take years. While Haig and Pétain were content
to wait on the Americans, Germany realized the war was turning in their favor. However,
the debacle with America created the first in a serious of diplomatic miscues for Germany
which, taken together, seriously hurt their increasing strategic power. The German plan to
win the war before America entered by using unrestricted submarine warfare was a
failure, but it was only one of many the German government committed before the war
was over. The problem for the German military was that although the war was turning in
their favor, their diplomatic corps under Arthur Zimmermann had just created a grave
error. Over confident of the situation in France, Zimmermann is directly responsible for
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bringing America into the war. Sharing this direct blame is Ludendorff and Hindenburg,
who by this time had assumed more control of the German government from the Kaiser.
Under their direction, the German navy resumed unrestricted submarine warfare,
believing that by the time America entered the war it would be too late to save the
Entente. The antagonism of America into war was the first in a pattern of poor German
diplomacy, which was a determent to all the Allied Powers.

36
The Ancillary Fronts in 1917

Germany‘s key ally, Austria-Hungary, was militarily ending 1917 in the best
possible position. Its war with Serbia, which had spread to World War, was over. Serbia
had been utterly crushed. As Russia collapsed in the East, Austrian troops advanced into
Romania. The Italian army had been decimated at Caporetto and like the French army,
was going into revolt. Since Austria-Hungary had no quarrel with Britain or France and
had exceeded all of its war goals, and was ready to end the war. Kaiser Karl‘s
government approached the German government with such a proposal. The German
government balked. The only peace it viewed as successful was a German peace. AustriaHungary was rapidly becoming disillusioned with their role in the Allied Powers. 53 The
war had pushed the Empire to the breaking point, but in its estimation it had succeeded in
all of its goals. Behind Germany‘s back, Karl sent peace feelers out to Britain and France.
Germany‘s disregard for its ally was tearing apart the Allied Powers. German leaders,
such as Ludendorff, realized the Austro-Hungarian Empire was reaching a breaking
point.54
On the surface, Germany‘s other major ally the Ottoman Empire was also in dire
straits. British troops had entered Jerusalem and Baghdad. Perceiving the British army to
be on the side of history, and handsomely rewarded with British gold, the Arab tribesman
had formed an alliance with Great Britain. However, Enver Pasha, military domo of the
Ottoman Empire, was willing to cede the Arab held lands of the Ottoman Empire. He
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looked east, to the historically Turkish lands dominated by Russia. As the British and
Arab forces moved through the Holy Land, Turkish troops seized control of large swaths
of Russian territory in the hopes of creating a massive Turkish empire. Ottoman Turkey
also received an unlikely diplomatic triumph when after seizing power in November of
1917 the Bolsheviks in Russia revealed the Western Powers goals in the Middle East to
be far from the noble enterprise they claimed. The gravest diplomatic wound to the
Entente was the revelation of Franco-British designs for the Middle East. While
promising their Arab allies a homeland, the British and the French were anxious to
supplant Ottoman Rule in the Middle East with their own. 55 The Turks were far from
defeated by the start of 1918.
Russia was the most massive disaster for the Entente in 1917. Ignoring the stream
of diplomatic pressure from Britain and France, Tsar Nikolai II appointed himself the
head of the Russian army. The British and the French were rightly worried that with
Nikolai at the head of the Russian army, he had personalized the military in the context
that any setback in the Russian military‘s fortune would be laid at the feet of the Tsar.
With another round of defeats suffered by the Russian army, the legitimacy of the Tsar
was the biggest casualty. Four hundred years of Romanov rule was coming to an end.
With the abdication of Nikolai in March 1917, the Russian parliament, the Duma, was
now in control of Russia, led by Aleksandr Kerensky. Kerensky doomed this March
revolution by deciding to keep Russia in the war. When the subsequent Russian offensive
collapsed, discontent in Russia grew to a breaking point. The army appeared to have gone
rogue and turned toward Petrograd to suppress discontent. Kerensky needed an armed
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force to protect the citizens of Petrograd from their own army. The only political force in
Russia with enough armed members was the Bolsheviks. Kerensky had to appeal to the
group that was most vocal in their opposition to a democratic Russia to save Petrograd.
Kerensky appealed to the highest ranking Bolshevik in Russia, Leon Trotsky, to release
the armed Bolsheviks, the Red Guard, to preserve the Revolution. The infant democracy
in Russia had just asked armed Communists to save their government.56
While Kerensky was in effect placing himself at the mercy of the Bolsheviks, the
Germans put in place a plan to knock Russia from the war. They brokered a deal with the
Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin to move him from exile in Switzerland home to Russia.
Lenin and the Germans both understood that the Russian people desired peace more than
anything. Once back in Russia, Lenin worked to undermine the few strands of legitimacy
left with Kerensky‘s government. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks toppled the
Kerensky‘s government and seized power.
As 1917 closed, victory appeared farther than ever from the Entente. The French
army had ceased to be an effective fighting force. Britain‘s attack at Ypres had proven to
be a disastrous waste of men and material. Manpower reserves in both Britain and France
were running low, as conscription drained men to the front. Italy‘s army was in shambles.
Britain was losing hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping each month to German Uboats. Worst of all, Russia was knocked out of the war and forty-four new divisions of
Germany‘s Eastern army were scheduled to arrive on the Western Front in time for the
German Spring Offensive, which was going to greatly shift the balance of power on the
Western Front. Ludendorff wrote that the spring of 1918 appeared to be the perfect
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opportunity to strike because ―[n]umerically we had never been so strong in comparison
with our enemies.‖57 The only problem Germany could create was if the peace treaty with
Russia took too long to finalize, thus delaying the troops from arriving by the scheduled
March start date. The Entente knew that America was on its way, but they quickly began
to realize that an American army was more of an idea than a reality. In any case,
American intervention was possibly going to arrive too late to matter. Finally, the
Entente‘s diplomatic secrets had been revealed to be far from noble, disheartening their
own troops and briefly encouraging the soldiers of the Allied Powers. 1918 was going to
begin with a remarkably inauspicious start.
The German government had the chance to cripple the Entente at the end of 1917.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire had conquered the Balkans, the Entente‘s role in the
Middle East was revealed to be little more than an imperialist design, and Russia had
been knocked out of the war. Yet, Germany misread the situation. They refused to
consider Austria-Hungary‘s peace plan and forced them to stay in the war. Germany took
a paternalistic approach to the Ottoman Empire and was willing to use their ally
whenever it suited German aims. For the Ottomans, this was a very thin line from
outright imperialism. With Russia, Germany only had to secure a favorable peace and
then it could remove its occupation force in time to attack the Entente before America
reached Europe. The actions on the Eastern Front were to have an essential role to play in
the outcome of the war on the Western Front.
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German Diplomacy in 1918

At the beginning of 1918, Germany realized it had its best opportunity to win the
war. The British army was licking its wounds in Belgium, the French sector was
unusually quiet, and the U-boat campaign was more successful than the planners had
predicted. Russia and Romania were sitting down at the peace table. America was
probably not going to make a difference until 1919. Finally, Austria-Hungary had secured
the Balkans and they were preventing the Italians from crossing the Alps. With a massive
number of troops soon to be repositioned from Russia to France, Germany‘s military
dynamic duo, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, were ready to strike the final
blow. Ludendorff readied the German army for a spring offensive, codenamed Michael in
honor of Germany‘s patron Saint. Before the first shot was ever fired, Germany‘s
diplomatic corps, failing to learn from its mistakes in handling America, was going to
cripple Ludendorff‘s offensive. Their remarkably amateurish approach to foreign policy
bought the Entente valuable time.
In 1917, the German Reichstag published its list of war aims. This list was meant
to reinforce Germany‘s claim that it had been fighting a defensive war. The key claim in
its war aims was that it sought no annexations or change to the antebellum status quo.
This claim was sharply contrasted by the Bolsheviks‘ publishing of the Entente‘s war
aims that blatantly sought colonial expansion and a restructuring of Europe. German
politicians had two chances in 1918 to enact the 1917 Reichstag resolution and they
failed to secure enough votes. This attempt by the German government to win the
propaganda campaign was doomed because Germany was constructing peace treaties
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which firmly put to bed the claim that they were fighting a defensive war. Germany‘s true
war aims were revealed to be an establishment of a new world order with the creation of
German dominated Europe. German victory over Romania and Russia was in fact a
demand for territory and treasure meant to enrich the Kaiserreich.
Germany needed to conclude a peace with Russia as soon as possible to release
troops from the Eastern Front if they were to be used in Ludendorff‘s spring offensive.
Germany‘s actions at the negotiating table at Brest-Litovsk proved to be a serious
hindrance to its military operations.58 Germany planned to strip Russia of large swaths of
its natural resources, territory, and population. Upon being presented with the terms, the
head of the Russian delegation, Leon Trotsky, walked out. Trotsky wrote: ―[W]e cannot
fight at present, but we have enough of revolutionary courage to tell you that we will
never of our own free will sign the terms which you are writing with your sword across
the bodies of the living peoples.‖ 59 Germany responded by resuming the war. As German
troops marched deeper into Russia, the nations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland,
Courland, and Ukraine broke from Russia. Trotsky argued that ―The only real serious
obstacle in the path of the German advance was the huge distances.‖ 60 Each of their
governments was pro-German. As German troops neared Petrograd, Lenin ordered
Trotsky to sign the treaty. He wrote: ―The absolute necessity of signing, at the given
moment, an annexationist and unbelievably harsh peace treaty with Germany is due
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primarily to the fact that we have no army and cannot defend ourselves.‖ 61 He reasoned
that German gains would be short-lived once the world revolution began. Even though
Russia was a defeated enemy, Germany‘s heavy-handed attitude toward them backfired.
Trotsky‘s initial refusal to sign the treaty meant that Germany could not pull its Eastern
troops to fight on the Western Front. The delay between Trotsky‘s abandonment of the
peace talks and Lenin‘s decision to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk bought the Entente
time. Also, Lenin‘s overriding of Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk signaled to the Germans that
the Russians were so desperate for peace that they would have accepted any treaty. The
German delegation misread the Bolshevik response as a bluff, not the desperate act that it
really was. Germany had to leave troops on the Eastern Front to ensure Russian
compliance and the establishment of satellite nations carved out of Russia that would
become German allies.62 Germany‘s informal empire in the east masked the fact that it
was a grave diplomatic miscalculation which helped doom the offenses already underway
on the Western Front. This narrow-sighted approach carried over to Romania. This had a
direct impact on German strategy on the Western Front because the Ludendorff offensive
had to be launched while a substantial number of German troops remained to secure the
Eastern Front.
With the collapse of Romania, Germany revealed its peace plan. Romania was to
become a rump state with territory being distributed to Bulgaria and the AustroHungarian Empire. This was essentially worthless, since Germany intended to dominate
its allies after the war. Germany laid bare its intention to economically dominate Europe.
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Germany assumed the rights to Romanian oil until at least 2017, appropriated the Danube
as a German waterway, and split Romanian agricultural yields between itself and AustriaHungary. The economies of the Allied Powers were tied together with a German customs
union.63 The façade of a negotiated peace without annexation and a return to the pre-war
economic status quo was torn away. Germany was going to use the weapon of economics
to control the Continent.
The political blunderings at Brest-Litovsk and Romania had another unintended
consequence for Germany: it provided a timely morale boost for the Entente. The lofty
idealism that greeted the outbreak of war, such as Britain‘s claim that it was fighting to
defend the existence of ―Poor Little Belgium,‖ had lost its entire luster by 1918. As the
war entered its fourth year, the rhetoric of 1914 was a distant memory. An implication of
the 1917 French mutiny was that France was fighting to defend itself and nothing more.
Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies to expand its holdings in the Tyrol, but by
1918 it was reduced to fighting a war of survival. Amongst soldiers on the Western Front
it was suspected, and confirmed by the Bolsheviks after seizing power, that the war in
other theaters was an attempt by the Entente to expand their influence across the globe.
The American army, yet to enter combat, still displayed the optimism that had vanished
from the Western Front. America brought to France liberal ideas of a ―world safe for
democracy,‖ national self-determination and liberation, all articulated by President
Wilson. 64 Once Germany violated these liberal principles, Entente troops adopted the
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American ideals that they were fighting for a better world. Although never fully restored,
the optimism of 1914 had a renaissance in 1918.

45
The 1918 Spring Offensives

In March of 1918, the British 5th Army, led by Hubert Gough, was ordered to
relieve French troops holding the old Somme battlefield. At Third Ypres Gough had
proved to be a remarkable poor and indecisive general. His career had received a brief
reprieve from General Haig, a close friend of Gough‘s. Yet Gough found himself as a
general in charge of a rapidly dwindling army. After Third Ypres, the British army
launched a reorganizing procedure to address structural deficiencies in its organization.
The French and Germans had taken similar steps in 1916. Troops were being pulled from
Gough‘s command to fill these gaps. The fighting capability of 5 th Army was rapidly
deteriorating. The defense positions of the Somme battlefield had fallen into grave
disrepair while in the French army‘s care. Haig ordered Gough to restore the defenses,
but Gough decided to dither and wait for the end of troop reorganization. No one within
the British command had realized that a massive abscess was forming on the Western
Front. The Somme battlefield was becoming the most poorly defended section of the
Western Front. If the Germans attacked this one point on the line the Entente was faced
with the potential for a disaster like none seen since 1914.65 On the 21st of March, 1918,
the Germans did just that.
A thick, low laying fog covered the Somme battlefield that morning. British
troops were unprepared when German artillery batteries opened fire. On the heels of the
barrage, small bands of German storm troopers raced across No Man‘s Land and
bypassed British defense strongholds. Their attacks behind British lines led to the spread
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of mass confusion amongst the 5th Army. They were woefully unprepared when the bulk
of the German army facing them launched their attack. Gough panicked and ordered full
retreat. As soon as Gough lost his nerve, control over the 5th Army was lost. Without an
effective commander, the depleted 5th Army inadvertently turned their retreat into an all
out rout. Haig quickly stepped in and sacked Gough. He could also clearly see that the
Germans were forming a wedge between the French and British armies. On the 25 th of
March, Haig wrote: ―I at once asked Pétain if he meant to abandon my right flank. He
nodded assent...In my opinion, our Army‘s existence in France depends on keeping the
British and French armies united.‖66 He was invited by Foch, now Chief of the General
Staff, to attend a meeting at Doullens on the 26th with Pétain. 67 This meeting drastically
changed the course of the war. In one swift move, the Entente armies became the most
efficient fighting force in the war. The desperation created by the German attacks forced
the French and British generals to check their egos and serve under a unified command.
Foch had become increasingly convinced of the necessity of a unified command. In
London on the 15th of March, before the German attack, he stressed that ―the [Entente‘s]
battle might be seriously compromised, under existing conditions, because unity of view
and of action would be lacking.‖68 Desperation forced a total strategic overhaul of the
Entente.
In addition to Foch, Haig, and Pétain other attendees at Doullens included the
French President and Premier, Raymond Poincaré and Georges Clemenceau, and the
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British Chief of Staff, Henry Wilson. After a fair share of bickering between Haig and
Pétain, the true purpose of the meeting was unveiled. The Entente leaders had reached a
decision that General Foch had displayed the best grasp of the situation in Europe. It was
proposed that he be named Supreme Commander, in charge of both the British and
French armies. For years, Haig had refused to entertain the notion of subjugating British
troops to French command. With the situation on the ground being desperate, however he
finally acquiesced. George Dewar argued that the selection was the perfect selection for
Haig, because he had worked well with Foch in the early phases of the war, when Foch
was liaison between the French and British armies. 69 Foch immediately ordered Pétain to
dispatch French troops to aid the British. 70 For the first time, the Entente armies were
fighting as a unified force. David Lloyd George wrote: ―I have always felt that we are
losing value and efficiency in the [Entente] Armies through lack of coordination and
concentration.‖71 As Supreme Commander, Foch could focus on grand strategy, a process
which had been sorely lacking since 1914. The move immediately began to bear fruit.
With the French army now actively harassing German gains, Ludendorff ordered
his armies to stop pressing a gap between the British and French armies and try to
recapture Arras and Vimy ridge. From their strategic location on Vimy ridge, British
troops were able to repulse the German advance. A similar German attack on the strategic
rail center at Amiens was repulsed by British and Australian troops. The Offensive had
69

George A.B. Dewar and Lt. Col. J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s Command,
December 19, 1915 to November 11, 1918, vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1923), 133—45.
70

71

Keegan, 402—03.

Charles Francis Horne, ed. Source Records of the Great War, vol. VI (USA:
National Alumni, 1923), 102—3.

48
lost its steam and Ludendorff canceled further action on April 5 th. Two days earlier, the
Americans endorsed Foch‘s appointment to Supreme Commander at a conference in
Beauvais, France. 72 General Pershing was intrigued by the possibility of the formation of
a Supreme Commander. During the Beauvais conference he fully endorsed the elevation
of General Foch with a speech that stated,
The principle of unity of command is undoubtedly the correct one for the[Entente]
to follow. I do not believe that its possible to have unity of action without a
supreme commander … Each commander-in-chief is interested in his own army,
and cannot get the other commander‘s point of view or a grasp of the problem as a
whole. I am in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the
[Entente‘s] cause depends upon it … I am in favor of conferring the supreme
command upon General Foch. 73
General Pershing was confident enough in Foch that he allowed the American army,
which at that point had refused all suggestions to subordinate American command to a
foreign general, to serve within French command. Foch recalled General Bliss, the
American liaison in France saying: ―We have come over here to get ourselves killed; if
you want to use us, what are you waiting for?‖ 74
Although the Allies were granted a breather, the results of Operation Michael
were daunting. The German army had overrun forty miles of territory. At the time, it was
the largest single gain of land since 1914. 75 The British and French armies had come
precariously close to being separated. Yet, the number of German casualties, around two
hundred and forty thousand, was mounting and key among them were the number of elite
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German storm troopers being lost. Entente cooperation had allowed the British and
French armies to apply emergency tourniquets to areas where the Germans were creating
breakthroughs. Working together bought them needed time to regroup. At this point in
the war, time was the most valuable asset.
In surveying the results of Operation Michael, Ludendorff realized the British had
made a grave tactical error in the defense of Amiens. In defending the vital rail head,
Britain pulled troops from the defense of the Channel ports. The area was held by the
Portuguese army, who was overdue to be recalled from the front lines. They were
exhausted and running low on supplies. Ludendorff prepared to attack this sector. On
April 9th, Operation Georgette was launched. The Germans first hit the Portuguese army,
which was easily routed. German troops raced toward the Channel ports in the hope of
cutting the British army off from resupply. As Foch gathered troops for a counterattack,
the British were pushed back to a defensive position fifteen miles from the ports. On
April 11th, Haig issued a special order of the day to all ranks of the British army. The
message famously concluded:
There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held
to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and
believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end. The
safety of our homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct
of each one of us at this critical moment. 76
Haig‘s ―backs to the wall‖ message worked beautifully. The British army tenaciously
fought to defend the Channel ports. This enabled Foch time to launch a counterattack
with British, French, and American troops. Ludendorff called off Georgette on the 29th of
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April. 77 Again, the German offensive had broken down once the combined Entente
armies had attacked, but manpower shortages were becoming critical on both sides.
The last obstacle to total inter-Entente unity was the American army. Before
General Pershing left for France, President Wilson urged him to maintain the American
army as a separate fighting force. Upon his arrival in France in 1917, Pershing was
continuously pressured by British and French representatives to subordinate the
American army to their command. Pershing spent a year in France defending the
sovereignty of the American army. He was well too aware that the American army was
not battle ready. To ensure the maximum number of American troops arriving in France
each month, the troops arrived bereft of equipment. American ―doughboys‖ were hastily
equipped with a combination of British and French weapons, uniforms, tanks, and
airplanes. Pershing‘s only compromise was to allow black combat troops to be
transferred to French command. As a former commander of the black cavalry unit named
the Buffalo Soldiers, Pershing was well aware that American combat regulations
prevented black and white soldiers from engaging in combat together. The Beauvais
conference was the first step in reconciling the American and other Entente views on the
role of American troops. Haig and Pétain wanted the American troops to serve as
replacements to the British and French armies. Pershing wanted a separate American
army that would serve under Foch like their British and French counterparts. With
manpower levels reaching a crisis, Foch called for an Entente conference on the first of
May at Abbeville France. The Entente finally accepted American claims of an
independent Army. In return, Pershing promised the Allies that the American army would
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engage with every battle ready unit whenever the Germans launched their next
offensive. 78 Also present at the meeting was Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando. 79 He too
endorsed Foch as Supreme Commander and placed the Italian army at his disposal. 80 The
combined Entente armies were now wholly unified. Germany and her allies now faced a
unified coalition that stretched from Belgium to the Italian Alps. The door to victory was
slamming shut on Ludendorff.
Ludendorff decided to shift objectives again. His plan for his new offensive,
Blücher-Yorck, sought to once again drive a wedge between the British and French
armies. He hoped the offensive would knock either out of the war before the American
Army was ready to fight, but unbeknownst to him, the Americans had been ready for
three weeks. Ludendorff still possessed the ability to auger the weakest point of the
Entente line to direct his attack. This is exactly where Blücher-Yorck struck on May 27th.
The line between Soissons and Rheims was held by a handful of British divisions pulled
from the front lines after suffering massive casualties in the previous offensives. To
support the British, the French Sixth Army was on their flank. The Sixth Army, under the
command of the remarkably inept General Denis Duchêne, fell victim to their
commander‘s panic. He needed to move his army, but Duchene could not decide where to
order his troops, giving the Germans time to fix their artillery. German artillery tore the
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massed Sixth Army to pieces. The Germans opened a hole on the Soissons-Rheims Front,
which allowed them to march virtually unhindered to the River Marne. Germany had
advanced to the area of its furthest extent in 1914. The massive German artillery piece
dubbed the ―Paris Gun‖ was brought forward. It could literally lob shells into the upper
stratosphere before falling on the city of Paris. 81 With Paris under bombardment, citizens
began to flee the city and the French government contemplated taking the same action.
Blucher-Yorck was finally halted after the United States Army, aided by French colonial
troops, launched a counterattack at Château-Thierry. The first major action taken by
American troops in the Great War was a success. Château-Thierry silenced doubts being
whispered about the effectiveness of the American soldiers. Foch was impressed enough
by the actions of the American Army that he ordered the United States Marine Corps to
reinforce faltering French troops near Belleau Wood.82 Foch‘s faith in the Corps was well
rewarded.
Ludendorff made a grave tactical mistake at Belleau Wood. He determined that
the French retreat signaled the Entente abandonment of the sector. Unprepared for an
attack, German positions were quickly overrun by the Marines. Thousands of German
prisoners of war were taken. Marine action at Belleau Wood prevented the reinforcement
of the advance on the Marne and essentially ended Blücher-Yorck.83 The Battle of
Belleau Wood significantly emphasized the success of the role of a Supreme
Commander. In the previous years of war, Ludendorff‘s initial estimation of the battle
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would have been correct. The retreating French forces did signify the abandonment of
that area of the front. However, with the leadership of the Supreme Commander, French
or other Entente troops reaching their breaking point could quickly be pulled from the
front and replaced by a fresh contingent from another nation. Ludendorff‘s failure to
grasp this concept was creating a disaster for the German army.
While the Marines were still clearing out German positions in Belleau Wood,
Ludendorff again shifted tactics. He planned another assault, codenamed Gneisenau, to
weaken defenses near the Channel ports and secure the railhead at Amiens. German
troops, beginning to sense a coming disaster, began to surrender themselves to the Allies
in increasing numbers. Some prisoners of war revealed the details of Gneisenau to their
captors. Ludendorff‘s luck in attacking the weakest points in the Entente lines had run
out. When the German army attacked across the Matz River near Compiègne stiff
resistance broke the German attack. Gneisenau was a total failure. The German army was
spent. Its best troops had been depleted throughout the Spring Offensives. 84 The Entente
armies had bent, but they never broke. Foch quipped: ―A great orchestra always takes a
certain time to put its instruments in tune; and when it is composed of diverse elements, a
tuning fork sometimes has to be employed to bring them into unison.‖ 85 The unified
fighting force of the Allies had proven successful on the defensive, but now Foch was
ready to test their strength on the offensive.
With a Supreme Commander in place to coordinate grand strategy, the German
Spring Offensives were launched against a completely different enemy. In 1916, the
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British aided the French at Verdun by launching a counter-offensive at the Somme,
almost six months later. In 1917, in order to support the French army after the failed
Nivelle Offensive, the British launched the Third Ypres Offensive, over three months
later. Now Foch could pull Entente units of all nationalities from anywhere in Europe to
respond to German attacks. Ludendorff lacked such an advantage. The war on the
Western Front was solely the responsibility of the German army. Kaiser Karl was in the
process of negotiating a peace with the British and the French and he knew that
committing any troops against them was going to undo his peace feelers. Further, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire was not at war with the United States.86 They were content to
wait out the war, but they were shackled to Germany and it was with Germany that their
fate was going to be decided.
With the German offensives exhausted, Ludendorff‘s subordinates began to
petition for a strategic withdrawal to more defensible positions. Ludendorff dismissed the
pleas out of hand. His inability to settle on a single strategy during the Spring Offensives
meant that the German gains were a collection of unconsolidated gains down the length
of the Western Front. In numerous places these gains formed an enfilade in which an
attacking Entente force could rain fire on the Germans from three directions.
Ludendorff‘s continued pursuit of the offensive also wasted his best troops, leaving the
lines to be guarded by reserve forces. His continued insistence on the attack also allowed
the Allies time to stockpile offensive weapons which were ineffective in defense, such as
tanks and airplanes87
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The Entente Counterattack

By the summer of 1918, the Entente stockpile of non-infantry weapons dwarfed
German supplies. The British and French combined to produce 5800 heavy tanks in
comparison to the twenty produced by Germany. Entente supremacy in shipping and
manufacturing also allowed a well equipped American army to take the field by the
summer of 1918. ―Best case scenario‖ German estimates had predicted an American
army of the size available in France would be impossible until 1919. 88 In this estimate,
they were not alone. As Foch prepared to counterattack German positions in the summer
of 1918, Entente governments were confident final victory was on hand, but not until
1919. This enraged Haig. On the cover of the British Military Policy 1918-1919, which
described the war stretching into 1919, Haig scribbled ―Words! Words! Words! Lots of
words! And little else.‖89 The success of the Entente offensive was going to take almost
everyone by surprise.
The first concern of the Entente armies was to relieve pressure placed upon Paris.
As the German offensive was grinding to a halt near the River Marne, Pétain suggested a
full offensive against them. Foch was planning for a later broad offensive and he vetoed
Pétain‘s plan. He suggested a limited counterattack conducted by the French and
American armies. Pétain devised a bold plan in response to Foch‘s idea. He abandoned
the forward trench near the river. The Germans incorrectly perceived this move not as an
abandonment of the defensive position, but rather a collapse in French resolve. They
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hastily launched an attack on the French line, bombarding the empty trenches. The
subsequent waves of German soldiers charged into a trap. Once they reached the
abandoned line of trenches, the French and Americans counterattacked. The surprise
essentially routed the Germans and they began to pull back from the River Marne.
Dubbed the Second Battle of the Marne, Pétain‘s strategy won a reprieve for the City of
Paris. Once Paris was out of danger, Foch ordered Pétain to halt. Foch planned on using
maneuvers such as the one Pétain engaged in to reverse all of the German gains. 90
Entente and German commanders had spent the war trying to force a large set piece battle
to end the war. In this way, their military strategy was a throwback to the Napoleonic
war.91 In the modern setting of the Great War, this tactic failed time and again as the
mobility of the war allowed defending armies to reinforce their lines and launch
successful counterattacks, which nullified tactical gains. Foch‘s approach radically
changed the dynamic. Limited offensives were quickly called off after a series of rapid
gains. This gave the attackers the advantages as they were granted time to consolidate
their gains. The Allies had learned the successful strategy for modern war. By fighting
on a united battle strategy, establishing realistic military goals for each battle, and
fortifying secure territory at the expense of a continuous advance the Entente was
achieving victory.
Foch presented his new strategy to his Entente commanders on the 24 th of July.
Above all, he urged them to focus on very simple objectives in the upcoming Entente
offensive. In addition to trying to force the opposing armies into a grand set-piece battle,
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generals in the Great War tied their offensives into ambitious goals which were simply
impossible for their armies to achieve. Overreach was consistently the most formidable
foe for any general up to that point. Foch revealed that his plan also called for continuous
pressure across the entire front. Once one Entente army had achieved its objective it was
ordered to immediately stop and consolidate its gains. Their objectives were to be no
further than the extent of their artillery support. While the Germans were recovering from
the attack, another Entente army was ordered to hit the line with their attack. It was
believed, correctly, that the Germans were prepared to defend their front everywhere,
which would leave them unprepared and uncertain which attack was ―the real one.‖
Ludendorff failed to comprehend until it was too late that they were all part of the real
attack. This plan was essentially the death of the German army through a thousand cuts.92
Foch found himself immediately surrounded by converts.
In a bold stroke, Foch discarded the military tactics which the Entente had used
since 1914. Victory was never going to come on the heels of a grand battle. Foch changed
the focus of the offensive into a series of small battles, which were far more damaging to
the Allied Powers than the previous grand battles of the war. Haig and Pétain realized
their armies were under tremendous strain and, with manpower levels falling in Britain
and France; they could not risk another massive attack until at least 1919. For Pershing,
Foch‘s proposal was welcomed because it gave him more time to build the American
military‘s strength. Pershing was worried that he was overextending his forces after the
rapid succession of Château Thierry, Belleau Wood, and the Second Battle of the Marne.
A limited attack granted the Americans the perfect opportunity to blend its new combat
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veterans with untested units. For all four men, the new strategy was a novelty. In a single
move they were throwing off the military doctrine, which had remained unchanged since
Napoleon. This was most dramatic for Foch, whose career at the École Supérieur de
Guerre featured him as the most vocal proponent of the sustained attack.93 Foch greatest
asset as Supreme Commander was his ability to adapt and learn from battle. He was not
the same man at the Second Battle of the Marne as he had been in 1914 at the First. This
keen ability contrasted with Ludendorff, whom in the midst of disaster, could not adapt to
new strategies.
With inter-Entente agreement on the new conduct of the war in place, they were
ready to take the fight to the Germans. The British were selected to be the first army to
strike in the Entente offensives slated to begin in early August. Haig presented a plan to
Foch to attack the new German lines near Amiens and secure the vital railhead. Since the
Gneisenau Operation had focused on the Franco-American lines, the British army had
gone the longest without fighting. This allowed Haig time to amass the airplanes and
tanks denied him the previous year at Ypres. Foch gave the plan the green light, with the
tentative start date of August 8th. The attack at Amiens was the first of the fatal cuts
suffered by Germany. Haig‘s overwhelming superiority in non-infantry units crushed
German resistance. Almost half of the German defenders surrendered to the British.
Ludendorff realized he had doomed the German army. He dubbed the 8 th of August as the
―black day of the German army.‖ 94
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Privately, Ludendorff shielded German leaders, including Hindenburg, from the
extent of the disaster facing Germany. On the 13th and 14th of August German leaders and
representatives from the Austro-Hungarian Empire met in Spa, Belgium. Ludendorff
went out his way to reassure the assembled leaders that the situation on the Western Front
remained positive. The lone voice of reason came from Kaiser Wilhelm, now essentially
a figurehead, who urged Germany‘s government to seek peace. The German foreign
minister, Paul von Hintze, placed his faith in Ludendorff‘s public façade over his Kaiser.
Von Hintze informed the Kaiser he was only willing to negotiate with the Allies after the
next German success. He wanted to negotiate from a position of strength, because he
concluded the only successful end to the war for Germany was to reassert its control over
Alsace-Lorraine and add Belgium to the Fatherland. Without Ludendorff‘s real data on
the extent of disaster facing the German army, von Hintze assured the Reichstag that total
victory was at hand. Germany‘s real problem in prosecuting the war was coming to the
surface. Ludendorff had become supreme warlord over the German government. His
power now eclipsed the Kaiser and the Reichstag. 95 As a warlord, he was a poor choice.
Unlike Foch, he lacked the ability to forgo his failed strategy and adapt to conditions on
the ground. Foch‘s role as Supreme Commander allowed him to serve as a liaison
between government and the military. Ludendorff was the head of the military and in
essence the government also. His obstinacy was ruining the German army and
furthermore was creating a political disaster for Germany and her allies.
At Spa, Kaiser Karl heartily endorsed Wilhelm‘s peace proposal. This was
unsurprising since Karl had tried to establish peace feelers with the Entente for over a
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year. The coalition of nationalities which made up the Austro-Hungarian Empire was
coming apart at the seams. As the Entente armies became a unified military front, they
also became united in their political goals. With their war aims firmly set, they decided
victory on the Western Front meant the Austro-Hungarian Empire was to be dismantled.
Entente political leaders endorsed the creation of an independent Poland and
Czechoslovakia. They directed their propaganda efforts to sew disunity from within the
Empire. In an attempt to divert pressure from within the Empire, the Austro-Hungarian
military launched another attack against the Italians, but were checked on the River
Piave. Karl pleaded with von Hintze to negotiate, but von Hintze only assured him that
total victory was at hand. Karl had had enough. He ordered his government to stop trying
to establish secret negotiations with the Allies and begin open negotiations. 96 Germany‘s
alliance with Austria-Hungary was finished. As the Entente came together, the Allied
Powers were breaking apart. The Entente could focus on destroying each nation in turn
without the threat of a unified front. At the moment when it was most essential for the
Allied Powers to work together they moved toward divorce.
As the Allied Powers bickered, the Entente kept up the pressure. A brief moment
of crisis swept the Entente command, however. Although Haig was surprised by the rapid
success of Amiens, he ordered his troops to halt once they reached their extent of artillery
support. Foch lost his head. He pushed Haig to continue the assault and attempt to force a
breakthrough. Haig adhered to Foch‘s earlier plan for attack and was forced to talk Foch
out of his new reckless plan. Once cooler heads prevailed, Foch turned to the Americans
to launch their attack. The Americans were sent in to pinch close a salient bulging into
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Entente lines near St. Mihiel. The Americans launched their attack on the 12 th of
September. Their timing could not have been better. The German military had decided
that the salient at St. Mihiel was one of the most difficult areas to defend. The decision
had been reached that the salient was to be abandoned. While the German defenders were
preparing to move, the Americans launched their attack. Panic and confusion spread
amongst the defenders. Their escape routes and defensive weapons were clogging the
roads away from St. Mihiel. They were quickly overwhelmed by the American troops. In
what was becoming a dangerous pattern for Germany, many of its soldiers surrendered en
masse. The Entente armies were capturing more and more German soldiers willing to
surrender. As 1918 progressed, this number increased exponentially. 97 The significance
of the number of troops willing to lay down their arms and quit fighting is that it
demonstrated the extent to which German morale was collapsing
With the St. Mihiel salient sealed, Foch moved the American army next to the
French army near the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest. He was expanding the
Entente attacks from pin prick attacks into more substantive gains. He planned for a
pincer movement which would squeeze as much of the German army in France as
possible. The Americans and the French were ordered to attack into the Argonne Forest
by following the Meuse Valley. As Franco-American forces moved north in the Meuse
Argonne offensive, the British were ordered to attack the German positions in the
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North.98 The pincer pushed the German armies back to the Siegfried Line, the area from
which they launched their attacks half a year earlier. In six months, the Entente had
retaken all of their lost territory and the Germans were still in retreat. 99 The German army
simply had no response to facing the entire coalition of the Entente‘s armies across the
whole front. On September 29th, the Entente penetrated the Siegfried line.
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The Splintering of the Allied Powers

With the German army in retreat on the Western Front, Entente leaders agreed to
apply pressure to Germany‘s allies in an attempt to isolate Germany. A multinational
force comprising units from Britain, France, Serbia, Italy, and Greece had held a foothold
in Salonika since 1916. The theater became irrelevant once the war on the Western Front
was consumed by the battles of 1916. With the war now in their favor, the Entente jointly
agreed to reopen the Salonika Front. Facing the Entente was the most ill-treated member
of the Allied Powers: the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians had hoped to win concessions from
Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but the Germans refused to invite them to the peace
negotiations. With the fall of Romania, Bulgaria was hopeful it could secure the area of
Dobrudja, but Germany gave it to Austro-Hungary. As Bulgaria and its army starved,
Germany appropriated Bulgarian food supplies for its army on the Western Front. For
Bulgaria, the war should have been over by 1916. Its main war aim, removing the threat
posed to it by Serbia and Romania, had been achieved by then. Now the Bulgarians were
forced to fight for German objectives. When the multinational force launched their attack
on the 15th of September, their Bulgarian counterparts were, thanks to the Germans, ill
supplied and demoralized. Entente troops raced into Serbia and Bulgaria in a mobile war
not seen on the Western Front. The Bulgarian government in vain pleaded for assistance
from Germany. With Germany‘s refusal to aid Bulgaria their fate was sealed. Two weeks
to the day after the Entente launched their attack from Salonika Bulgaria capitulated.
Bulgaria‘s role to Germany was less of an ally and more of a territory to be dominated.
After Germany had taken what it needed from Bulgaria, its usefulness steadily declined.
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When Bulgaria faced its gravest crisis, Germany watched from the sidelines. This sent a
clear signal that Germany‘s allies were disposable if they conflicted with German selfpreservation. Suspicion grew amongst the Allied Powers as the fortune of war abandoned
them. 100
Leaders in Germany by now had slowly realized that they were on the irreversible
path to defeat. Hoping to gain favor with the Entente in future negotiations, von Hintze
revealed a plan to reform the German government. As domestic unrest gripped the
country, von Hintze believed the people could be co-opted by moving Germany toward a
constitutional monarchy, with true power being yielded by the Reichstag. He also
proposed a liberalization of the franchise laws. In his military headquarters, Ludendorff,
the real power in Germany, was in no position to weigh in. On the 28th of September,
Ludendorff suffered a nervous breakdown. He fell to the floor in a series of convulsions
and foaming at the mouth. Once he regained his senses he announced the truth to
everyone for the first time: Germany had lost the war. The next day, as Entente troops
crossed the Siegfried line, he urged an assembled war council to accept peace with the
Entente on the basis of Wilson‘s Fourteen Points. The urgency of the meeting was
coupled with the announcement that Bulgaria had quit the Allied Powers and surrendered
to the Entente. Germany‘s allies fought the Great War in isolation. The military
strategists of the Allied Powers viewed each front, with the exception of the Western and
Eastern Fronts, as a separate military sector possessing no impact on another front. The
Entente viewed the separate fronts as a means to isolate Germany before crushing her
from all sides. Germany‘s inability to unite her allies created a hazard it did not
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appreciate until the fall of Bulgaria. Bulgaria‘s capitulation was the end of the Allied
Powers. Diplomatic relations between Vienna and Berlin were at a nadir as AustroHungary latched onto self-preservation, even at the expense of Germany. 101 Germany had
tried to dominate her allies, not cooperate with them. As the tide of war turned, Germany
found itself standing alone.
With the collapse of Bulgaria, the Entente broke out from the Salonika Front.
British and French troops diverged. The French marched toward Vienna and the British
approached Constantinople. Germany‘s final partner in the Allied Powers, the Ottoman
Empire, was under threat of invasion. In the closing years of the war, the Ottoman
Empire led by Enver Pasha had engaged in a bold gamble to reinvigorate the empire.
Pasha decided to forge a new Ottoman Empire in the Turkish regions once under Russian
dominance. The Turks had been granted an unexpected reprieve by Germany‘s Spring
Offensives. Although the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force under the command of
General Edmund Allenby had captured Jerusalem in the waning days of 1917, progress in
the Holy Land was blunted as troops were transferred from Allenby‘s command to shore
up units in France. As T. E. Laurence argued, the situation became dire as ―the Turks
from Amman might now have leisure to sweep …back to Akaba.‖ 102 Allenby
reorganized the EEF with a collection of Indian, Australian, New Zealander, Ghurkas, the
British Territorial Army, and Arab units under the command of Prince Faisal bin Hussein
bin Ali al-Hashemi. Allenby was a veteran of the Western Front and he sought to forge
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inter-allied cooperation between the British and the Arabs similar to the situation in
France and Belgium between the British, French, and Americans. In another similarity to
the Western Front, a non-unified force from the Allied Powers opposed Entente forces.103
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The Ottoman Empire Collapses

The Ottoman Empire had thrown their lot with the Allied Powers in November of
1914. The Germans had hoped that the Ottomans could divert British attention away from
the Western Front to protect India. The Ottoman plan to cripple the British in India was
to declare jihad. Sultan Mehmed V, a figurehead placed on the throne by the Young
Turks in 1909, publically issued the call to jihad on the 14th of November, 1914.104 The
plan was a dismal failure. Muslim sepoys in the Indian army remained loyal to the
British. Worse for the Ottoman Empire was the fact that the British were able to find a
man willing to place a counterclaim on the Turkish call for Holy War: Hussein bin Ali,
the Sharif of Mecca. Arabs loyal to the Sharif fought in conjunction with the British
under the command of his son, Prince Feisal. Although the British dispatched the
flamboyant and self-publishing T.E. Lawrence to serve as an advisor to the Arabs, the
Germans placed little faith in their Muslim allies. They assumed direct control over the
Ottoman forces. The German generals in charge displayed a propensity to disregard
Ottoman lives and an overall disregard for the fighting effectiveness. This created a
tenuous distrust between the troops in the field and their German overlords. Erich von
Falkenhayn, onetime German Chief of Staff whose career had gone into a tailspin after
the German disaster at Verdun, was placed in charge of the Ottoman army defending
Palestine. He promptly failed to defend the city and as the Ottoman army retreated north
through the Golan Heights he was sacked in favor of Otto Liman von Sanders, who
ordered the Ottomans to construct defensive positions north of Palestine. Ludendorff was
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attracted to Liman because he had successfully repulsed the failed Entente landings at
Gallipoli. However, in his pre-war career Liman was tasked with reforming the Ottoman
army along Western lines. He was convinced this task was virtually impossible and
viewed the Ottoman leadership and army as inferior to Western forces. Liman refused to
attack the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the moment it was being stripped of its
fighting effectiveness. He believed the Ottomans were only capable of fighting defensive
maneuvers, so he ordered his troops to take defensive positions and wait for the attack. 105
His distrust for his ally wasted the best opportunity that the Allied Powers had in
crippling Entente efforts in the Middle East. The Ottomans were realizing that their
collective future was irrelevant to Germany‘s military leaders.
As the Entente threatened to invade Anatolia from the West, through Syria, and
from Mesopotamia, the Ottoman army in the east turned from securing Turkish lands to
capturing the oil-rich city of Baku, in modern day Azerbaijan. Aside from the Ottomans,
the British and the Germans were also trying to secure Baku. At this point it was not the
British army, but the Germans that threatened the Ottoman advance on Baku. In late
June, Ottoman military command in the Caucasus, in the person of Halil Pasha, advised
Enver Pasha to declare war on Germany if they secured the city first. Enver dismissed the
advice and contacted his German and Austro-Hungarian allies with a plan to reorganize
the Allied Powers into a unified fighting force; the exact step that the Entente Powers had
devised in April. Whilst the Entente had picked the most able military leader to be
Commander in Chief, the Allied Powers elected Kaiser Wilhelm to coordinate military
operations, a tall order for a figurehead. Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans were
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excluded from the supreme war council advisory panel. 106 The Germans were totally in
charge. Enver‘s bid to unify the Allied Powers in fact revealed the disunity of them. This
did not reinvigorate the Allied Powers; rather it reinforced the decision amongst the
Ottomans and Austria-Hungary to quit the war before they were overrun for no other
reason than keeping Germany alive. As Otto Liman von Sanders sat on the defensive,
Allenby finished his reorganization of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. On his right
flank, Faisal‘s Arabs began clandestine raids on Ottoman supply lines and probing raids
on Turkish defensive positions. The Ottoman defensive sector was further weakened by
desertions from Arabs serving in the Ottoman army. With his right flank secured and the
Ottomans defending against Faisal‘s skirmishes, Allenby launched a feint attack along
the Jordan River valley. Liman took the bait and extended his defensive perimeter to stop
both Faisal and the phantom attack. This left large swaths of his front ill-defended.
Allenby used those weaknesses to maneuver the Ottomans into battle at Megiddo.
Allenby‘s multinational force was supported by ANZAC cavalry and air units, with
Faisal‘s Bedouin raiders flanking the Ottoman defenders. The Battle of Megiddo was a
rout. The Ottoman army collapsed, opening the road to both Damascus and an invasion
corridor into Anatolia. Allenby had placed his faith in Faisal‘s Arab force to preoccupy
the Ottomans in his hour of need. The EEF had to rebuild after the crisis on the Western
Front depleted his army of critical manpower. The Arabs bought him the time that he
desperately wanted.107 Opposing Allenby and Faisal was Otto Liman von Sanders, whose
view of his Ottoman army was a self-fulfilling prophecy: he expected little of them, thus
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he limited their combat role; their failure only reinforced his insular view. 108 As on the
Western Front, the Entente‘s ability to work together in a time of crisis was creating a
series of victories, whilst the Germans lack of faith in their allies was engineering a series
of defeats.
The collapse of Otto Liman von Sanders‘ army was the final nail in the coffin for
Enver Pasha‘s pan-Turkish strategy. As the bulk of his army was engaged in securing
Turkish territory from Russia, which had quit the war a year earlier and was not
technically at war with the Ottomans, Enver left the defense of Constantinople to the
Bulgarian army. With Bulgaria‘s capitulation, Constantinople was open to invasion from
the British army breaking out from Salonika. The collapse of his army in the Middle East
opened Constantinople up to attack from the east, as no army was left to oppose
Allenby‘s EEF from invading Anatolia and turning westward. Left with nothing more to
fight for than self-preservation, the Ottoman Empire sued for peace. Germany had just
lost one of its two major allies, but in the view of German military strategy, the Ottomans
had served their purpose. The Ottoman Empire‘s worth to Germany as an ally lay in their
ability to distract the Tsar‘s army and prevent the Russians from reinforcing their
defenses against German and Austro-Hungarian attacks. Constantinople‘s strategic
position closed the Dardanelles to Entente shipping, preventing them from reinforcing
Russia in the Black Sea. It also bottled up the Russian Black Sea fleet and prevented it
from linking up with Entente naval forces. The final possible contribution from the
Ottomans was their ability to harass Allenby‘s EEF to the point where they could not
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reinforce the Western Front.109 It was Germany‘s own commander, Otto Liman von
Sanders, who failed at this task. His lack of faith in his Ottoman allies convinced him to
wait on the defensive and allowed the initiative to slip from his grasp. Even on the
defensive, Liman was a disaster because his lack of trust in his Ottoman ally prevented a
proper defensive posture. His army was overrun by a British force that was aware it was
fighting a disorganized ally. This had a direct impact on the Western Front because the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force was stripped to the minimum manpower level possible.
With the Ottomans putting up almost no resistance in the Holy Land, British troops could
be shifted from the Middle East to the Western Front. When the Ottoman Empire
capitulated to the Allies, its value as an ally to Germany had run its course. While
nominally part of an Allied Powers unified command, Enver Pasha had used his army to
pursue his own ends. As the Great War drew to a close and the Allies consolidated their
objectives, the Allied Powers‘ failure to unite and place self-interest as their paramount
war aim was damning the Allied Powers‘ fighting effectiveness. As their fortunes in war
continued to deteriorate, Germany‘s other significant ally, Austria-Hungary, also looked
for an exit.
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The Destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire

The Austro-Hungarian Empire is a microcosm for the failures of the Allied Powers.
Tensions and long held grievances undermined the unity of the Empire. When the Empire
was faced with setbacks it was unable to unify and instead sought to protect its various
self-interests, even if those self-interests undermined the conduct of the war. In the early
years of the war, Germans likened the alliance with Austria-Hungary to being shackled to
a corpse. This was the exact view held by the German general staff. The German
military‘s low estimation of its Austro-Hungarian counterpart led to a string of insults. To
the then Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, Germany‘s military
―assistance‖ appeared to be nothing more than a veiled attempt to secure territory for
Germany at the expense of Austria-Hungary‘s expansionist goals. Conrad was so
dismayed he privately referred to the Germans as Austria-Hungary‘s ‗secret enemy.‘110
By 1918, the wounds had not healed; they had become infected.
As the British army turned east in the Salonika breakout, the French forces turned
west to begin a march on Vienna. With the Austro-Hungarian army moving to defend
their territory from the French invasion, the Italians prepared to launch their first
offensive in almost a year. Foch considered the Italian Front vital to the success of the
war. He described the object of the Italian Front as: ―To shatter the resistance of the
Austrians, or, in any case, to draw to their side a portion of the German forces which
were then engaged on the French front.‖ 111 After the disastrous Battle of Caporetto to
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conclude 1917, the Italian army experienced a series of strikes and mutinies similar to the
French army that same year. Also like the French experience, the Italians decided to halt
all future offensive operations. Italy‘s version of Robert Nivelle, Luigi Cardona, was
quickly sacked and replaced by the most able of all Italian commanders: Armando Diaz.
Diaz mimicked Pétain‘s reorganizational tactics, vastly improving the lot of the average
Italian soldier. His actions quickly restored morale and ended mutinies within the Italian
army. His decision to end offensive actions by the Italian army for the time being meant
that his soldiers could focus on neglected defensive positions. Diaz focused most of his
defensive construction on the River Piave. This sector was a key failure for the Italians
during the Battle of Caporetto.112 This is precisely where the Austro-Hungarian army
attacked in June of 1918.
The Battle of the Piave is a microcosm of the failure of the Austro-Hungarian
army. The Empire‘s forces were led by the new Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, Arthur
Arz von Straußenburg. The army in the field was led by two army commanders that
personified the personal and racial divisions that hampered the Austro-Hungarians
throughout the war. One army group was led by Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the onetime Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff that had lobbied then Emperor Franz Josef more
than anyone for war against Serbia. While Chief of Staff, he placed little faith in the
commander of the Austro-Hungarian‘s Fifth Army commander, Svetozar Boroević, who
was now his fellow army group commander. An ethnic Croat, Boroević had showed
promise in early fighting on the Eastern Front. Once the Italians joined the Allies in 1915,
he was given command of the Fifth Army, which was dispatched to check possible Italian

112

Thompson, 294—323.

74
advances. Fearing an Italian advance through Slovenia which could possibly threaten the
Austro-Hungarian heartland, Conrad ordered Boroević to abandon Slovenia and reinforce
the approaches to Vienna. Conrad trusted neither the Croat Boroević, nor the Fifth
Army‘s, which possessed a large contingent of ethnic Slovenes to halt the Italians.
Conrad‘s view was based on the ethnic rivalries in the Hapsburg Empire. He could not
believe a Croat could stop the Italians. He also did not believe the Slovenes manning the
5th Army possessed loyalty to any cause other than Slovenia. Boroević bypassed Conrad
and appealed directly to Emperor Franz Josef, who gave Boroević his consent to operate
freely. This began a personal rivalry between Conrad and Boroević. Franz Josef‘s faith
was well placed. Boroević defeated the Italians in all eleven Battles of Isonzo. With the
defeat of the Italians at Caporetto and fresh reinforcements arriving daily from the
Eastern Front, Chief of Staff Straußenburg turned to Boroević and Conrad to devise a
plan to knock the Italians out of the war. Neither man could work together, thus they
proposed conflicting plans to Straußenburg, which diminished the role of the other.
Unable to decide between the two plans, Straußenburg decided to implement both. On the
Italian Front, the failure of inter-Entente cooperation was replaced with the failure of
intra-Entente cooperation. By splitting his forces, Straußenburg presented the Italians
with their best chance for victory. 113 Unlike the Austro-Hungarians, the Italians were no
longer fighting alone.
The Italians were aided by key reinforcements from their allies, including the
Americans although they were technically not at war with Austria-Hungary. Diaz, now
under Foch‘s command, ordered his army to stop and consolidate its gains, which
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mirrored the strategy proving successful on the Western Front. Diaz‘s multinational force
was able to defeat Boroević and Conrad‘s splintered armies in turn. The inability of the
Austro-Hungarian commanders to subordinate their egos and positions to a unified
command doomed the Italian Front. While Haig, Pétain, Pershing, and Diaz were able to
fight together under Foch‘s command, Boroević and Conrad‘s personal enmity was
allowed to fester by Karl. 114
The Italian army was in desperate need for a morale boost, which was exactly
what the Battle of the Piave provided. The Austro-Hungarian defeat allowed Diaz to
finish reorganizing the Italian army. With fresh troops arriving from Britain, France, and
America the Italian army was ready to shift from the defensive to the offensive. Diaz
waited until an opportunity to present itself to launch the attack and the increase in ethnic
tensions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire provided him with the perfect plan to
attack.115
The House of Hapsburg was collapsing. The international liberalism prevalent in
Woodrow Wilson‘s Fourteen Points was filtering into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
most resounding message to the minorities present in Austro-Hungarian Empire was
Wilson‘s emphasis on national self-determination for all people. The first group to seize
this rhetoric and attempt to put it into action were the Czechoslovaks. 116 Discontented
Czechoslovaks armed themselves and marched south into Italy. There, they linked up
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with Diaz‘s army on the Piave and allied themselves with his army for the coming battle.
Kaiser Karl attempted to blunt Wilson‘s Fourteen Points by instigated sweeping reforms
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On the 16th of October, the Empire announced it was
adopting a Federal structure. The key exclusion by Karl was that of Hungary, which as
King of Hungary, was an attempt by him to attain some control over the dominated Slavs
from establishing their own state. The Empire was not dying; it was dead. Wilson
rejected Karl‘s proposal as Czechoslovakia announced their independence and the Slavs
announced the formation of their Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, more famously
known as Yugoslavia. Even the two dominant groups, the Austrians and the Hungarians,
were at their breaking point. People lived on the brink of starvation. The German army
continued to appropriate grain from the conquered territories to feed itself with total
disregard for the growing crisis. The army acted. Food distribution had been the
frustratingly difficult task assigned to General Ottokar Landwehr von Pragenau, but after
a year in office he was well too aware that Austro-Hungarian food supplies were about to
dip below the starvation line. German grain shipments had become too tempting of a
target to rectify the situation and he dispatched the army to the Danube. They attacked
grain shipments sailing the Danube from the Ukraine in transit to Germany. Ludendorff
was furious. He drew up plans and a declaration of war against the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. Although Ludendorff was talked down from making any rash decisions, the final
nail had been driven into the coffin of the Allied Powers. Austro-Hungary was a shadow
force unable to either maintain order at home or secure its borders. 117 Diaz and his
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Entente army had waited for Austria-Hungary to commit suicide before acting. The 23rd
of October was a day of action.
With Austria-Hungary now abandoned by its German ally and nationalities within
the Empire fleeing from Hapsburg control, Diaz ordered his army into battle against the
decimated Austro-Hungarian army. They tried to hold the Piave River for a few days at
Vittorio-Veneto, but they could not withstand the combined Entente assault. The AustroHungarian army essentially collapsed. The soldiers were so demoralized that they fled
Italy entirely and simply returned home. The Empire had lost the legitimacy of its rule.
The route to Vienna was open to Diaz on the Italian Front and French General Louis
Franchet d‘Esperey breaking out from Salonika. Germany was neither unwilling nor
unable to save its former ally. 118 As with the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire‘s perceived usefulness to the Germans had run its course. They too could be
disposed. In reality, Germany‘s failure was to recognize the role that Austria-Hungary
had played. By holding the Italian led coalition at bay in Italy, conquering the Balkans,
and harassing the Russians on the Eastern Front, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had
enabled the German army to possess flexibility in fighting the Great War. For three years,
the Austro-Hungarian Empire had protected Germany‘s southern flank, but when
Austria-Hungary faced invasion the German government simply washed its hands of its
ally. Germany‘s contempt for its ally allowed the idea to grow among government
officials that Germany was better off severing the alliance. In doing so, Germany was
opening a fissure that could have allowed the Italian armies to cross the Alps and link up
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with the rest of the Entente on the Western Front. Germany would soon be standing
alone.
On October 28th in Prague and the 29th in Zagreb republics were officially
declared in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia respectively. Quite cognizant that the war
was over, Austrians and Hungarians in Vienna and Budapest rioted for an immediate
ceasefire on Halloween. The alliance between Austria and Hungary was at its conclusion
as in the midst of these riots the Hungarian government in control at Budapest informed
Karl their intention to leave the alliance. In a bid to retain power, Karl signaled he was
willing to remain Kaiser of Austria solely. Further demonstrating this split was the
inability of the former allies to quit the war together. Since assuming the throne in 1916
after the death of his great uncle Franz Josef, Karl, advised by his French bride, had tried
to extricate Austria from the war. Behind the German government‘s back, the AustroHungarian Empire had sent out peace feelers. The Entente governments refused to listen
because they viewed the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany as indivisible.
Thus, they assumed the peace proposal to be a ploy from the Allied Powers to buy time.
By November, with the war being essentially over on the Italian Front and the split
between Austria-Hungary and Germany out in the open, the Allies decided to deal with
the Empire. Austria quit the war on the 3rd of November, but Hungarian did not do so
until the 13th, which was actually two days later than the Germans. Austria wanted to stop
the bleeding of its territory into Italy as soon as possible. 119 They were willing to quit if
they could maintain a claim of legitimacy in the Tyrol. For the Hungarians, Austria was
acting after much of its territory, namely the Magyar dominated areas of Yugoslavia and
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Czechoslovakia had left the Empire. Tensions rose once Karl, unwilling to see the
victorious Entente sink his navy, gave the Austrian navy to Yugoslavia. Tensions were
muted once Italy, unaware of the exchange, sank the Austrian navy, now in the
possession of their ally. As an Empire, Austria-Hungary was always a tenuous coalition
between diverse ethnic groups. The Great War did not create ethnic strife within the
Empire, but it did exacerbate it enough to where it became uncontrollable by the Dual
Monarchy. As the territories held by the Austro-Hungarian Empire broke free, Germany
began an aggressive stance towards its erstwhile ally. The Austro-Hungarian government
had realized their alliance with Germany was essentially a path for German dominance.
Twenty years later an Austrian completed the German domination of Austria with the
Anschluss Österreichs in 1938. Germany was more of a threat to Austria-Hungary than
the Entente.
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The Decline and Fall of the House of Hohenzollern

With defeats racking up on the field for Germany and their commander writhing
on the floor and foaming at the mouth, the German government began to collapse. On the
29th of September, a day after his episode, Ludendorff informed the Kaiser it was
imperative that the German government negotiate an armistice with the United States on
the basis of President Wilson‘s Fourteen Points. This forced German Chancellor Georg
von Hertling to resign. He was succeeded by Max von Baden, who urged Ludendorff to
buy him more time to end the war. Although Baden was handpicked by Kaiser Wilhelm,
he was also a liberal reformer. Baden and Ludendorff tried to devise a plan to end the war
with the best possible outcome for Germany. Baden rammed through legislation in the
Reichstag that exponentially enhanced the power of parliamentary democracy at the
expense of the Kaiser. Ludendorff tried to break up the Entente. Ludendorff authorized
cables to be sent to President Wilson inquiring about a negotiated peace along the lines
established in his Fourteen Points. Ludendorff was forming a plan to split the Entente and
prevent the American army from reinforcing the Anglo-French armies. If America could
be taken out of the war, the German army could face the British and French alone,
strengthening Germany‘s position at the negotiating table. Wilson failed to take the bait.
In consultation with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and French President
Georges Clemenceau, he rejected the German peace feeler. Although Baden was
transforming Germany in essence into a Constitutional Monarchy, these steps were not
enough for Wilson. If the Kaiser retained a modicum of power it was still too much to
satisfy the Entente. Wilson informed the German government that the only way the
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Entente would deal with Germany was without the Kaiser. In the midst of the discussions
between Berlin and Washington, Ludendorff had ordered the German army into a virtual
ceasefire. On October 23rd Wilson signaled he was no longer willing to negotiate without
his allies. Ludendorff ordered his army back into battle. 120
The German soldier on the ground realized what the temporary ceasefire had
meant: the war was ending and Germany was exploring ways to quit fighting. The
German army had not been on the offensive in months, supplies and materials were
running low, and the ceasefire forced the realization upon most German soldiers that it
was a beaten army. Ludendorff resigned his command three days later. 121 Ludendorff‘s
plan to split the Entente was quite similar to the plan in place for the Entente to split the
Allied Powers. The difference for Ludendorff, and hence his failure, was the structure of
the Entente versus the Allied Powers. The Entente fought as a force of equals under a
unified command of the most able general, in this case Ferdinand Foch. The Allied
Powers fought as a German dominated force under a figure head commander in chief,
Kaiser Wilhelm. Foch could place his faith in any member nation of his allies to attack
weak points on the Allied Powers‘ line. The Germans placed so little faith in the fighting
capabilities of their allies that they never trusted them enough to sustain the initiative in
fighting. Germany tried to fight the Great War everywhere and in turn left themselves
weak in areas that their allies could have reinforced their positions. Foch never hesitated
to place his faith in his allies, including the untested American army or the oft defeated
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Italian army, to stand firm in the face of the Allied Powers‘ aggression. Once Germany
was perceived to be weak, her allies abandoned her as soon as possible.
The Prussian dominated military structure of Imperial Germany was trapped in a
war they could not exit. Generations of strict military training prevented them from
designing an adequate exit strategy. A negotiated peace was rejected by the Prussians
because their view of war held out for either total victory or total defeat. Two ideas were
available, in their minds at least, and they both involved the Empire going down in a
blaze of glory. The first idea was presented to the Kaiser at his headquarters in Spa,
Belgium. General Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff‘s replacement, discussed with the Kaiser
and General Hindenburg a plan for the Kaiser to reestablish order within the German
Empire. He advised the Kaiser to visit the frontlines and in the course of his visit allow
himself to be killed by enemy gunfire or at the very least be gravely wounded. The Kaiser
and Hindenburg immediately vetoed the idea. The Kaiser claimed it would lead to the
deaths of too many good men and suicide ―was made impossible by my firm Christian
beliefs.‖122
The second plan involved Germany‘s largest untapped fighting force. With the
German army engaged in a delaying action holding the Western Front to the best of their
ability and preparing to fall back to defensive positions on the Rhine the only available
fighting force to them was the Kaiserliche Marine, the Imperial Navy. The High Seas
Fleet of the Kaiserliche Marine had been anchored in port at Wilhelmshaven since 1915.
In 1918 Chief of Naval Staff Reinhard Scheer and commander of the High Seas Fleet
Franz von Hipper devised a final play for glory to improve Germany‘s bargaining
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position in any future post-war settlement. The High Seas fleet was ordered to put to sea
and raid the Belgian cost and the Thames before meeting the Grand Fleet in a final act of
glory; a suicide run to inflict as much damage and humiliation on the Royal Navy as
possible. Scheer and Hipper knew they were damning the sailors of the Kaiserliche
Marine to a watery grave, so they refused to inform Chancellor Max von Baden. On
October 30th, as the boilers of the Kaiserliche Marine were being stoked in
Wilhelmshaven, the German sailors realized they were being ordered on a suicide
mission. To preserve their lives they mutinied. The naval mutiny spread between the port
at Wilhelmshaven and the port at Kiel. At Kiel, the sailors allied themselves with the
socialist and communist anti-war demonstrations. The sailors‘ lists of demands included
the end of the war and the abdication of the Royal family. On the 2 nd of November,
troops being transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front also mutinied. They
refused to go into battle and aligned themselves with the sailors and leftist protestors
demanding the end of the war.123
Remarkably, the deteriorating situation went unrecognized by the Entente military
leaders. As the German troops from the Eastern Front were mutinying, the Western
powers were meeting to draw up war plans for 1919. They unanimously agreed to an
invasion led by General Armando Diaz of Bavaria slated for spring of 1919. Two days
later, German sailors were joined by twenty thousand German soldiers on a planned
march to Berlin. That same day, the Entente finalized plans to invade Lorraine on the 14 th
of November. Baden realized the desperate situation in Germany. The loudest voices for
revolution in Germany were coming from the radical left. Germany was close to falling
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into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The war had to be ended as quickly as possible with a
socialist government in power to blunt the calls for radical revolution. On November 7 th
he dispatched a peace delegation, led by the leader of Germany‘s Center Party Matthias
Erzberger, to meet with General Foch at his headquarters near Compiègne. Foch received
them but refused to listen to their message until there was a change in the German
government and the Kaiser had officially abdicated. This had been part of Baden‘s plan,
but the Kaiser refused to accept his advice. On the 8th of November the Kaiser ordered
Hindenburg and Groener to turn the army back to Germany and quash the growing
rebellion. Groener informed the Kaiser that the army no longer supported the
Hohenzollern dynasty and they would rebel if ordered to attack German citizens. Reality
was finally brought home to Wilhelm. He was informed that ―the army could fight no
longer and wished rest above all else, and that, therefore, any sort of armistice must be
unconditionally accepted…as soon as possible, since the army had supplies for only six
to eight days more.‖124 He abdicated the next day and fled into exile in the Netherlands.
Baden resigned the Chancellorship in favor of the socialist Fritz Ebert. With Germany
now a republic, Foch opened negotiations with Erzberger. They agreed for a ceasefire to
go into effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. The war on
the Western Front was over.
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Conclusion

Seven months to the day after General Haig issued his special order of the day
which described the British army as having its ―back to the wall,‖ the Entente powers had
defeated Germany, the last standing member of the Allied Powers. The collapse of
Germany was an utter surprise. Before the Spring Offensives in 1918, the most optimistic
Entente leaders believed they could successfully win the war in 1919 at the earliest. In
May of 1918 Paris was closer to falling into German hands than at any point of the war
since 1914. Even when the Ottoman Empire had exited the war and Austro-Hungary was
negotiating their exit from the war, the Entente still felt it necessary to plan for an
invasion of Germany in 1919. Although German soldiers from Ludendorff to Corporal
Adolf Hitler blamed the defeat of Germany on the collapse of the home front, the German
home front only began to collapse after the army in the field had been defeated. A
military crisis precipitated a political reordering of the Entente chain of command.
Germany‘s successes in the Great War were always due to its ability to isolate its
enemies in a particular attack. Once the Entente reformed and fielded a united front
against the Germans, the initiative rapidly shifted away from the German army. Outside
of the Western Front, Germany cynically viewed its allies as little more than cannon
fodder whose most important task was to buy Germany time on the Western Front.
Although this strategy worked reasonably well whenever Germany maintained the
initiative, once the war turned against the Allied Powers that unity evaporated. The
German government‘s failures at inter-allied strategy were echoed by the diplomatic
blunders in the arena of foreign policy. This is in sharp contrast to the Entente, which
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when faced with its most desperate moment of the war in 1918 forged a unified command
structure that made the Entente unbeatable. The Entente learned when the Germans did
not.
For years, Germany allowed a cold war to simmer between Berlin and
Washington. The antagonism toward America culminated in 1917 with the Zimmermann
telegram and the decision to return to unrestricted submarine warfare. These poor
decisions coincided with the German army‘s triumphal defeat of Tsarist Russia. As
Kerensky‘s Russia was teetering on the verge of collapse, the United States was entering
the war. Germany‘s unnecessary antagonism of the United States created a new enemy
combatant at the exact moment it had shifted the balance of military power in Europe
decisively in its favor. After three years of war had exhausted most of the manpower in
Europe, Germany found itself at war with a nation able to place millions of fresh troops
into the field.
Germany‘s peace treaties with Russia and Romania finally put to be the lie that
Germany was fighting a defensive war. The German government‘s heavy handed
treatment of the new Bolshevik government was so harsh that Lenin ordered Trotsky to
refuse to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This prolongated the war in the East long
enough for American troops to begin to deploy on the Western Front, granted Britain
time to start reorganizing after the 1917 Third Ypres Offensive, and bought time for the
French army to recover from the mutinies following the Nivelle Offensive. On the Italian
Front, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk also prevented the Austro-Hungarian Empire from
deploying enough troops to exploit their victory at Caporetto. By the time troops from
Austria-Hungary were dispatched to Italy, the Italian led coalition of Italian, British,
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French, American, and Czechoslovak troops were able to first repulse and then defeat the
Austro-Hungarian army across the River Piave.
Furthermore, those treaties revealed Germany‘s plan to reform Europe into a
series of German dominated satellites. As these treaties were being unveiled for public
consumption, the Entente could publicly wrap itself in President Woodrow Wilson‘s
liberal idealism. The propaganda benefits from Wilson‘s idealism sharply contrasted
Germany‘s territorial acquisitions in the East. Wilson‘s emphasis on national selfdetermination resonated within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia parlayed their visions of their own homelands into active support for the
Entente enabling them to harass their Austro-Hungarian overlords on the Salonika and
Italian Fronts.
Finally, unified command of the Ententes‘ armies granted Foch the luxury of
elasticity that eluded Ludendorff. The Spring Offensives of 1918 succeeded at first
because the offensive blunted the Entente‘s superiority in non-infantry units. The plan
failed because Ludendorff had not learned the evolving nature of the Great War. The
Spring Offensives lacked any form of strategy other than territory gained. With Foch in
total control of the Entente‘s coalition forces could coordinate their defenses. Once the
momentum of initiative swung away from the Germans, Foch was able to implement a
new strategy to win the war. For the first time during the Great War the Entente fought as
one. Grand schemes to seize as much ground as possible were discarded in favor of
limited attacks to wear the German army down. This contrasted sharply with the
stratagems of 1914-1917 when the Entente carried out separate campaigns with their
allies, only becoming involved when pressure was needed to relieve their exhausted
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soldiers. With pressure being applied to the German army everywhere on the Western
Front it could no longer properly defend in depth. The scale of the Entente‘s
counteroffensive left the Germany army in a precariously weak position.
The German government‘s policy of veiled condescension towards its allies
weakened the Allied Powers throughout the war. Once the war shifted against Germany,
those festering wounds crippled the Central Powers ability to fight the Great War. The
Allied Powers‘ inability to unite proved fatal when the Entente fought in lockstep. The
united forces of the Entente, finally fighting as a unified coalition, overwhelmed the
German army in 1918. In the midst of their darkest hour, the Entente realized that unity
was the only path to defeat the German war machine.

89
Bibliography

Primary Sources
Brooke, Rupert. 1914 and Other Poems. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1915.
Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis 1911-1918. New York: Simon and Schuster,
2005.
Dewar, George A. B. and Lt. Col. J. H. Boraston. Sir Douglas Haig’s Command,
December 19, 1915 to November 11, 1918, vol II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1923.
Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari. Washington: Office
of Air Force History, 1983.
Falkenhayn, Erich. General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical
Decisions. Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval & Military Press, 2004.
Foch, Ferdinand. The Memoirs of Marshal Foch. Translated by Col. T. Bentley Mott.
New York: Doubleday, 1931.
George, David Lloyd. War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1917-1918. Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co, 1931.
Graves, Robert. Good-bye to All That. New York: Doubleday, 1957; New York: Anchor,
1998.
Haig, Douglas. War Diaries and Letters, 1914-1918. Edited by Gary Sheffield and John
Bourne. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005.
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1973.
Hohenzollern, Wilhelm. The Kaiser’s Memoirs, Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, 18881918. General Books, 2009.
Horne, Charles Francis, ed. Source Records of the Great War, Vol. 6. USA: National
Alumni, 1923.
Jünger, Ernst. Storm of Steel. Translated by Michael Hoffman. New York: Penguin, 2003.
Lawrence, T.E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor Books, 1991.
Lenin, Vladimir. The Revolutionary Phrase. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968.

90
Ludendorff, Erich. Ludendorff’s Own Story, August 1914-November 1918, vol. II.
Lexington: Bibliolife, 2001.
Owen, Wilfred. The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen. Ed. C. Day Lewis. New York:
New Directions, 1963.
Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War vol I & II. Blue Ridge Summit, PA:
TAB, 1989.
Siegfried Sassoon. Diaries 1915—1918. Edited by Rupert Hart-Davis. London: Faber &
Faber, 1983.
———Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man. London: Faber & Faber, 1960.
——— Memoirs of an Infantry Officer. New York: Coward, McCann, Inc., 1930.
——— Sherston’s Progress. London: Faber & Faber, 1936.
——— Siegfried’s Journey. London: Faber & Faber, 1946.
——— The Old Century and Seven More Years. London: Faber & Faber, 1986.
——— The Weald of Youth. London: Faber & Faber, 1986.
Trotsky, Leon. The History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk. London: George
Allen & Unwin LTD., 1919.
Wilson, Woodrow. ―Too Proud to Fight.‖ Lecture, Convention Hall, Philadelphia, PA,
May 10, 1915.
Secondary Sources
Axelrod, Alan. Miracle at Belleau Wood: The Birth of the Modern U.S. Marine Corps.
Guilford, CT: Lyon, 2007.
Barr, James. Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in
Arabia, 1916-1918. New York: W. W. Norton, 2008.
Biddle, Tami Davis. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and
American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004.
Bond, Brian. The Unquiet Western Front: Britain’s Role in Literature and History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Carlisle, Rodney. Sovereignty at Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry into
World War I. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2009.

91
Chickering, Roger. Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918. 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Clarke, Alan. The Donkeys. New York: Award Books, 1965.
Cooper, John Milton. The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Crankshaw, Edward. The Fall of the House of Hapsburg. New York: Penguin, 1983.
Dawley, Alan. Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War: Explaining World War I. New York: Basic Books,
1999.
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Owl Books, 1989.
Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. New York: Oxford University Press,
2000.
Gilbert, Martin. The First World War. New York: Owl Books, 1994.
Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack
1916-18. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
Hart, Basil Liddell. The Real War. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1964
Horne, Alistair. The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. London: Penguin Books, 1993.
Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Vintage, 1998.
Koenig, Robert. The Fourth Horseman. New York: Public Affairs, 2006.
Lengel, Edward G. To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918. New York: Henry Holt,
2008.
MacDonald, Lyn. The Called It Passchendaele. New York: Atheneum, 1989.
Morrow, John H. The Great War: An Imperial History. London: Routledge, 2004.
Neiberg, Michael S. Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War. Washington:
Brassey‘s Inc, 2003.

92
Orlow, Dietrich. A History of Modern Germany 1871 to Present. 6th ed. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008.
Ousby, Ian. The Road to Verdun. New York: Anchor Books, 2003.
Schwabe, Klaus. Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 19181919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Translated by. Robert
and Rita Kimber. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
Simpson, Andy. Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front,
1914-1918. Staplehurst, Kent, UK: Spellmount Ltd., 2006.
Sowerwine, Charles. France Since 1870. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
Stone, Norman. World War One: A Short History. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
Strachan, Hew. The First World War. London: Penguin, 2003.
Thompson, Mark. The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919. New
York: Basic Books, 2008.
Tooley, Hunt. The Western Front. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.
Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front & the
Emergence of Modern War 1900-1918. South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2003.
Watson, Janet S. K. Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World
War in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Wiest, Andrew. The Western Front 1917-1918. London, Amber Books, 2008.
Wilson, Trevor. The Myriad Faces of War. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986.
Woodward, David R. Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East. Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 2006.
Zieger, Robert H. America’s Great War: World War I and the American Experience.
Lanham: Bowman and Littlefield, 2001.

